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ISEC 2005
Inclusive and Supportive Education Congress
International Special Education Conference
Inclusion: Celebrating Diversity?
1st - 4th August 2005. Glasgow, Scotland
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Equality of Opportunity as a Rationale for Inclusive Education
Dr. Christian Liesen
Institute for Special Education – University of Zurich, Switzerland
Hirschengraben 48, CH-8001 Zurich
liesen@isp.unizh.ch
This paper seeks to discuss whether the principle of equality of opportunity could serve as a rationale for inclusive education. The first section aims at positioning the topic within the inclusive education discourse, narrowing down the scope. The second section presents a brief analysis of the notion of ‘equality of opportunity’ as well as some of its implications, while the third section addresses the question of how we are to know whether opportunities are equal. The last section seeks to draw some conclusions with respect to inclusive education. – It should be pointed out that the paper is solely meant for discussion.
1. The case for inclusive education: reasons and rationales
Many arguments have been brought forward to strengthen the case for inclusive education. Yet it is not always easy to follow the lines of reasoning, and little reflection is needed to notice certain contradictions and ambiguities and a good deal of eclecticism in the literature. The crux is, as Alan Dyson observed, that
(i)nclusion is different from many other fields of inquiry in that it is premised on an answer rather than a question. That ‘answer’, of course, is that inclusive education is superior in one or other way to non-inclusive education. The strength in this position is that it enables a relatively young field to define and advance itself in the face of considerable hostility. (…) The danger, however, is that it becomes all too easy for thinking on inclusion to descend from analysis to polemic, and for certain values and beliefs to become ossified, ultimately to the detriment of those marginalized groups on whose interests the inclusion movement claims to act. ( Dyson, 1999, p. 43f. )
Dyson has suggested to distinguish between two different but intersecting dimensions of the inclusive education movement: One is primarily concerned with providing a rationale for inclusion, whereas the other concentrates on the realisation of inclusion. Each dimension can again be subdivided into different discourses as follows. A rationale for inclusive education is either sought with reference to rights and social justice or by rigorously questioning the efficacy of special education (while claiming the superiority of inclusive education). The realisation of inclusion is frequently discussed either with respect to the political struggle for the implementation of inclusive education, or it is concerned with what inclusive education looks like inpractice (cf. Dyson, 1999, pp. 38-43 ). It is safe to say that these two dimensions / four discourses deliver a felicitous depiction of the inclusion debate’s crucial building blocks.
This paper is concerned with adumbrating the question whether equality of opportunity could serve as a rationale for inclusive education. It belongs, hence, in the context of the rights and social justice discourse. Concededly, the most important (and most interesting) question would actually be how the different building blocks interrelate, or ought to interact, in order to achieve progress in the field. Dyson does offer some very sensible and perspicacious suggestions on this (cf. ibid., pp. 44-48). The line of reasoning chosen here, by contrast, will allow only for a few rather cautious remarks in the final part of the paper. Proposed is the idea of merging, in a way, ethical considerations and empirical research in order to substantiate the case for inclusive education. As a consequence, some fundamental policy issues will emerge, alongside certain difficulties inherent to the rhetoric of inclusion.
2. Equality of opportunity
Let us shed, as a first step, some light on the principle of equality of opportunity. Peter Westen (1990) has presented an illuminating formal analysis. He states that opportunity
designates both a single concept and a multiplicity of conceptions. Each opportunity is like every other in that all opportunities reflect a certain formal relationship among agents, obstacles, and goals; but each opportunity also differs from other opportunities in that each is a relationship among particular agents, particular obstacles, and particular goals. ( Westen, 1990 , p. 171, italics added)
This may seem simple enough. Nevertheless, an important point with respect to the rhetoric of opportunity is already implied here: When opportunities are stated as a reason for, say, political action, speakers often do not specify the particular agents, obstacles, and/or goals they have in mind. Such a speech may still meet with approval although the underlying conceptions of speaker and listener may turn out to be radically different on closer examination. Rhetorical difficulties like these should be kept in mind.
Equal opportunities do not lead to equal outcomes. On the contrary, equal opportunities lead to inequality. There is sense in which a strong commitment to equality of opportunity is incompatible with equality of outcomes, and a society that aims at equalising opportunity is very different from a society that aims at equalising outcomes. The reason is that
(a)n ‘opportunity’ to attain a goal is a chance to attain a goal, not necessarily a guarantee of attaining it. Insofar as people have opportunities that are less than guarantees of what they wish, some of them will inevitably attain goals that others fail to attain. To create equal opportunity, therefore, is virtually always to allow people ‘to become unequal by competing against [their] fellows.’ (Westen, 1990, p. 176f.)
That equality of opportunity leads to inequality has some deeper implications. It can be argued that opportunities express and deliver a certain kind of liberty or freedom which is essential for society and which can not be achieved otherwise. Equality of opportunity is indispensable. T.D. Campbell enunciates the point as follows:
An opportunity may be said to occur when an agent is in a situation in which he may choose whether or not to perform some effortful act which is considered to be desirable in itself or as means to the attainment of some goal which is considered to be desirable. An opportunity is thus a type of liberty or freedom for it involves the absence of prohibitions or obstacles limiting what agents may or can do or acquire. […] (A)n opportunity is something which the agent may or may not take advantage of depending on whether or not he chooses to do so. One of the points about describing a situation as an opportunity is that this indicates that the outcome of the situation depends in part on the choices made by the person who has the opportunity. Opportunities can always be missed or passed up, neglected or rejected. Of course I may be forced to have an opportunity (as when I was compelled to go to school) but it is not an opportunity which I am forced to have if the attainment of the desired goal does not depend to some extent on my choices, that is, for instance, if whether or not I become educated as distinct from go to school, does not depend to some extent on my own volitions. If education as such could be compelled then we would not speak of educational opportunity, at least not in those cases where it is compelled. ( Campbell, 1975, p. 51/54, italics added )
It is true, of course, that not all opportunities are of particular concern to us. People do not care for all kinds of opportunities; they care first and foremost for educational and occupational opportunities. A ‘fair’ or ‘equal’ distribution of opportunities is relevant and vital especially in these domains. What comes into play here, then, is that equality of opportunity must be seen as a matter of distributive justice. A just society will usually seek to equalise opportunities in the sense of distributing them fair an equal. It is worth noticing, however, that opportunities can not be created or distributed at will. Westen notes that
creating one opportunity may mean denying another. Thus, whenever a society creates an opportunity by removing an obstacle that affects people differentially, it denies people the opportunity to benefit from the differential. And, whenever a society creates an opportunity by removing human obstacles, it denies people the opportunity to exploit those obstacles. This does not mean that societies should refrain from creating opportunities. It means, rather, that … the significant question for opportunity is not ‘Whether opportunity?’ but ‘Which opportunities?’ (Westen, 1990, p. 171)
Consequently and in most cases, with equality of opportunity as a rationale for inclusive education, apparently interests will have to be balanced. The interests of those who are excluded from participating effectively in society – of which the education system forms an essential part – will have to be weighed against the interests of those who are successful within such a framework and ‘benefit from the given differential’. A society will therefore have to deliberate about equalising opportunities, which is, ultimately, a democratic process (belonging to the realisation dimension).
It should be emphasized, however, that when a mismatch between a person’s situation and what may be called the dominant cooperative framework of society occurs, the results may be devastating. Being excluded from participating in the most basic interactions and cooperation of society strongly calls for compensation and adjustment. On this basic level, the interest in inclusion will by and large outweigh the interests of those who may be deprived of being as successful as they could be otherwise. If people are denied basic opportunities in this sense, they will normally be in the position of making strong claims in the cause of justice. But the question of particular interest is then, of course, ‘How do we know they are denied these opportunities?’, or more general, ‘How do we know whether opportunities are equal or not?’, e.g. in an education system.
3. How do we know when opportunities are equal?
We have seen so far that we should focus our attention on educational and occupational opportunities; that opportunities secure individual liberty and freedom and lead, consequently, to inequalities; and that equality of opportunity is a matter of distributive justice and may result in strong claims of justice in at least some cases. But on what grounds is it legitimate to judge whether opportunities are equal or not? How do we assess and evaluate equality of opportunity, especially with respect to inclusive education?
There is a substantive answer to this question. Any inquiry into whether opportunities in a given society are equal or not – or within parts of a society, such as the education system – will have to start from ascertainable inequalities under the prevailing circumstances. These inequalities will have to be sufficiently and adequately described in a way that most people would agree is accurate. (We will look at an example in a moment.)
The crucial point to be addressed will be whether or not the portrayed inequalities indicate that the principle of equality of opportunity has been violated. Onora O’Neill (1977) has argued that two different positions suggest themselves. One may be called the ‘formal’ (or ‘liberal’) position. It stresses that inequalities are due to the fact that people may choose to or refrain from taking advantage of the opportunities at hand. The members of society may be extremely unequal in educational and occupational attainment, but if so, it must be the result of the varying capacities, volitions, and desires of those to whom the respective selection procedures are applied. Once the distributive and selective procedures are fair, there is nothing left to complain about. As O’Neill points out,
(s)uch an ‘equal-opportunity society’ would … not be characterized by equal incomes or equal property holdings or equal standards of living or of education. (…) Equal opportunity in the formal sense does not ensure equal success or equal health or equal status, but only the fair application of the rules governing the pursuit of such goods. This is the equality of opportunity of … a society in which there are winners and losers, and in which winning appears often as merited by the winners and losing as deserved by the losers – for did they not all have equal opportunity to win? ( O'Neill, 1977 , p. 180)
The other position may be called the ‘substantive’ (or ‘egalitarian’) position. It stresses that inequalities must not indicate a disproportionate success of certain social groups in a society. Instead, all major social groups – but not all individuals – must fare equally well.
An equal-opportunity society on the substantive view is one in which the success rates of all major social groups are the same. (…) A strong commitment to substantive equality of opportunity demands that any under-representation of some group in some line of employment / income group / educational group be due solely to the unmanipulated choice of members of that group. (…) Substantively equal opportunity is achieved when the success rates of certain major social groups – such as the two sexes, various ethnic groups and perhaps various age groups – are equalized. It is not breached when there are large differences between the most- and least-successful members of these groups, provided that there are equally large differences between the most- and least-successful members of other major social groups. It is not true in a society which aims at substantively equal opportunities that all individuals have the same chance of any given type of success. For individuals are all members of many differently defined groups, and substantive equality of opportunity seeks only to equalize their chances qua members of certain major social groups; it seeks to eliminate inter-group differences, but not to alter intra-group ones. ( O'Neill, 1977 , p. 181-83)
This position is ready to acknowledge that people’s perspectives in life are not exclusively ascribable to a person’s capacities, volitions, and desires. As a matter of fact, there are disadvantages which are undeserved and beyond individual control, such as being disabled or of old age. The ‘substantive’ position is concerned with identifying adequate characteristics of major social groups to enable sound comparisons and call for compensation where needed.
To illustrate, a good example are some results from the PISA study (cf. www.pisa.oecd.org). The OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an internationally standardised assessment that was jointly developed by the participating countries (30 OECD member states plus 13 associated countries in the first assessment in 2000; at least 58 countries will participate in the next assessment in 2006). PISA claims to assess “how far students near the end of compulsory education have acquired some of the knowledge and skills that are essential for full participation in society.” The idea is to give information about the capacities and the potential of education systems. Does an education system prepare students well?
It is only recently that OECD has published some findings concerning equity and quality in the light of the PISA 2000 results. The report states that
(i)n sum, PISA 2000 results show that students in integrated education systems perform, on average, better than those in selective education systems, and that their educational performance is less dependent on their background. Many factors may be at play here. A higher average performance suggests that the more heterogeneous student groups or classes in integrated education systems could have a beneficial effect for the lower-performing students. Also, the flexibility offered by an integrated system may allow students to improve their performance while keeping their academic options open. ( OECD, 2005 , p. 89)
In the main findings section, the report reads:
A striking result was the advantage that comprehensive education systems appear to have in terms of student performance (quality). PISA 2000 results suggest that the performance of students enrolled in comprehensive education systems is less dependent on their socio-economic background. ( ibid., p. 94)
From the perspective of equality of opportunity, it is not so much the aspect of performance (‘quality’) that is of interest here but rather the aspect of uncoupling socio-economic background and performance (‘equity’). There are some countries – Germany is a sad example – in which the social background of a student has a very strong impact (‘predictive power’) on student performance. This means, to put the matter bluntly, that it is not a student’s capacity to perform that determines what he or she will achieve, but first and foremost his or her socio-economic background. The result is that students with a low social background are manifestly underrepresented on the higher levels of the education system.
The ‘liberal’ position has no option but to ascribe this situation to individual factors, say, motivation or ability. This is highly implausible, at least in the case of countries that have had to experience a rude awakening by PISA, such as Germany or Switzerland. ‘Substantive’ equality of opportunity, on the other hand, is precisely concerned with cases like these: Members of a major social group – i.e., students with a lower socio-economic background – are disadvantaged due to factors that are undeserved and beyond individual control, while other groups display disproportionate success. This does call for an equalisation of opportunities.
4. Equality of opportunity and inclusive education: some considerations
In the final part of this paper, I would like to draw some conclusions concerning equality of opportunity and inclusive education.
First, I think that equality of opportunity can serve as a rationale for inclusive education if and only if inclusion is understood in the sense of equity. This would mean to adopt the substantive view of equal opportunity, and will require to provide empirical evidence to show that a major social group of society is indeed undeservedly disadvantaged. It would also mean to suggest that some form of inclusive education is the right course of action to take.
Second, to provide a rationale for inclusive education is obviously very different from the realisation of inclusive education. It should be kept in mind that other interests will have to be allowed for as well and that there might be considerable opposition, even if the claims could compellingly be shown to be legitimate ones. This should not belie the fact, however, that being in the position to provide a rationale for inclusive education is very different from simply claiming that it is right. It is precisely because different and mutually incompatible interests are involved that arguments have to be provided (and there are some highly interesting contributions in this kind of spirit, for example Booth & Ainscow, 1998; Pijl, Meijer & Hegarty, 1997; Vitello & Mithaug, 1998 ).
Third, if this idea bears any validity at all, it has to be pointed out that the rhetoric of inclusion tends to disguise some fundamental points here, especially in relation to policy. For example, the rhetoric of ‘celebrating diversity’ tends to downplay the fact that different legitimate interests are involved and have to be balanced. Cause for concern gives also the factor that any policy perspective will always have to operate along the lines of defining social groups. It may come as a surprise that this is not only due to administrative reasons (cf. Dever, 1990 ) but is also demanded from an ethically informed perspective. There are no claims of distributive justice – and hence no rationale for inclusive education – without the construction of social groups. The talk of heterogeneity isn’t much help in these matters, the more so as it quite often blurs who is thought to be the target group of inclusion within the inclusive education discourse.
Fourth, it will be as unavoidable as it is fruitful to strive to merge ethical considerations and empirical research in some respect. The idea behind this is that an empirical basis is indispensable in order to substantiate claims, while at the same time ethical considerations are indispensable to provide a sensible interpretative framework for empirical findings and to draw sound conclusions. One main feature of these arguments, reasons and rationales is that they must be eligible to convince others on grounds they can not reasonably reject – to convincingly argue the case.
Fifth, there seems to be a broad consensus that inclusive education has to be conceptualised as a general education topic, not as another issue of special education. Equality of opportunity might help us to engross the implications of what this actually means. It might help us to see the big picture.
Sixth, it has to be pointed out that there is not one choice in these matters, but many. There is no unequivocal course of action to take. Dyson’s proposal to talk not of inclusion, but of inclusions, and to seek not a single form but a wide range of inclusive practice and organisation (1999, p. 46), deserves a good deal more of attention. Moreover, I think the field of special education should be very serious about Seamus Hegarty’s remark that inclusive education has to be about changing and modifying system in a way that preserves all its strengths (cf. Hegarty, 1998 , p. 156).
References
BOOTH T. & AINSCOW M. (eds.) (1998) From Them to Us. An International Study of Inclusion in Education. London: Routledge.
CAMPBELL T.D. (1975) Equality of Opportunity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75, 51-68.
DEVER R.B. (1990) Defining Mental Retardation from an Instructional Perspective. Mental Retardation 28 (3), 147-53.
DYSON A. (1999) Inclusion and Inclusions: Theories and Discourses in Inclusive Education. IN Daniels H. & Garner P. (eds.) World Yearbook of Education 1999: Inclusive Education. London: Kogan, 36-53.
HEGARTY S. (1998) Challenges to Inclusive Education: A European Perspective. IN Vitello S. & Mithaug D.E. (eds.) Inclusive Schooling: National and International Perspectives. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 151-65.
O'NEILL O. (1977) How Do We Know When Opportunities Are Equal? IN Vetterling-Braggin M., Elliston F.A. & English J. (eds.) Feminism and Philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 177-89.
OECD (2005) School Factors Related to Quality and Equity. Results from Pisa 2000. Paris: OECD.
PIJL S.J., MEIJER C. & HEGARTY S. (eds.) (1997) Inclusive Education: A Global Agenda. London: Routledge.
VITELLO S. & MITHAUG D.E. (eds.) (1998) Inclusive Schooling. National and International Perspectives. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
WESTEN P. (1990) Speaking of Equality. An Analysis of the Rhetorical Force of Equality in Moral and Legal Discourse. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
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Labels: Angels from the Promised land, Anno Domini, Mary Magdalene, Sang Real, Swift Hand of God
Monday, March 3, 2008
Anno Domini Nostri Iesu (Jesu) Christi ("In the Year of Our Lord Jesus Christ").
Is Deep in the Heart of Texas~
Anno Domini
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"AD" redirects here. For other uses, see AD (disambiguation).
Dionysius Exiguus invented Anno Domini years to date Easter.
Dionysius Exiguus invented Anno Domini years to date Easter.
Anno Domini [1] (Medieval Latin: In the year of the/(Our) Lord),[2][3] abbreviated as AD or A.D., is a designation used to number years in the Christian Era, conventionally used with the Julian and Gregorian calendars.[4][not in citation given] More fully, years may be also specified as Anno Domini Nostri Iesu (Jesu) Christi ("In the Year of Our Lord Jesus Christ").
The calendar era which it numbers is based on the traditionally reckoned year of the conception or birth of Jesus. Before Christ, abbreviated as BC or B.C., is used in the English language to denote years before the start of this epoch.
Though the Anno Domini dating system was devised in 525, it was not until the 8th century that the system began to be adopted in Western Europe. According to the Catholic Encyclopedia, even popes continued to date documents according to regnal years, and usage of AD only gradually became more common in Europe from the 11th to the 14th centuries.[5] In 1422, Portugal became the last Western European country to adopt the Anno Domini system.[5]
Year numbering using the Anno Domini system (or its related Common Era (CE) designation) is the most widespread numbering system in the world today. For decades, it has been the unofficial global standard, recognized by international institutions such as the United Nations and the Universal Postal Union. Its preeminence is due to the European colonisation of the Americas and the subsequent global spread of Western civilisation with the introduction of European standards in the fields of science and administration. Its association with the Gregorian calendar was another factor which promoted the spread of the numbering system.
Traditionally, English copied Latin usage by placing the abbreviation before the year number for AD, but after the year number for BC; for example: 64 BC, but AD 2008. However, placing the AD after the year number (as in 2008 AD) is now also common. The abbreviation is also widely used after the number of a century or millennium, as in 4th century AD or 2nd millennium AD, despite the inappropriate literal combination in this case ("in the 4th century in the year of Our Lord").
Because B.C. is an abbreviation for Before Christ, some people incorrectly conclude that A.D. must mean After Death, i.e., after the death of Jesus.[6]
Contents
[hide]
* 1 History
o 1.1 Accuracy
o 1.2 Popularization
* 2 Synonyms
o 2.1 Common Era
o 2.2 Anno Salutis
* 3 Numbering of years
* 4 Notes and references
* 5 External links
[edit] History
Further information: Calendar era
During the first six centuries of what would come to be known as the Christian era, European countries used various systems to count years. Systems in use included consular dating, imperial regnal year dating, and Creation dating.
Although the last non-imperial consul, Basilius, was appointed in 541 by Justinian I, later emperors through Constans II (641–668) were appointed consuls on the first January 1 after their accession. All of these emperors, except Justinian, used imperial postconsular years for all of the years of their reign alongside their regnal years.[7] Long unused, this practice was not formally abolished until Novell xciv of the law code of Leo VI did so in 888.
The Anno Domini system was devised by a monk named Dionysius Exiguus (born in Scythia Minor) in Rome in 525. In his Easter table Dionysius equates the year AD 532 with the regnal year 284 of Emperor Diocletian. In Argumentum I attached to this table he equates the year AD 525 with the consulate of Probus Junior.[8] He thus implies that Jesus' Incarnation occurred 525 years earlier, without stating the specific year during which his birth or conception occurred.
"However, nowhere in his exposition of his table does Dionysius relate his epoch to any other dating system, whether consulate, Olympiad, year of the world, or regnal year of Augustus; much less does he explain or justify the underlying date."[9]
Blackburn & Holford-Strevens briefly present arguments for 2 BC, 1 BC, or AD 1 as the year Dionysius intended for the Nativity or Incarnation.
Among the sources of confusion are:[10]
* In modern times Incarnation is synonymous with conception, but some ancient writers, such as Bede, considered Incarnation to be synonymous with the Nativity
* The civil, or consular year began on 1 January but the Diocletian year began on 29 August
* There were inaccuracies in the list of consuls
* There were confused summations of emperors' regnal years
Two centuries later, the Anglo-Saxon historian Bede used another Latin term, "ante uero incarnationis dominicae tempus" ("the time before the Lord's true incarnation"), equivalent to the English "before Christ", to identify years before the first year of this era. [11]
Another calculation had been developed by the Alexandrian monk Annianus around the year AD 400, placing the Annunciation on March 25, AD 9 (Julian)—eight to ten years after the date that Dionysius was to imply. Although this Incarnation was popular during the early centuries of the Byzantine Empire, years numbered from it, an Era of Incarnation, was only used, and is still only used, in Ethiopia, accounting for the eight- or seven-year discrepancy between the Gregorian and the Ethiopian calendars. Byzantine chroniclers like Maximus the Confessor, George Syncellus and Theophanes dated their years from Annianus' Creation of the World. This era, called Anno Mundi, "year of the world" (abbreviated AM), by modern scholars, began its first year on 25 March 5492 BC. Later Byzantine chroniclers used Anno Mundi years from September 1 5509 BC, the Byzantine Era. No single Anno Mundi epoch was dominant throughout the Christian world.
[edit] Accuracy
"Although scholars generally believe that Christ was born some years before A.D. 1, the historical evidence is too sketchy to allow a definitive dating".[12] According to the Gospel of Matthew (2:1,16) Herod the Great was alive when Jesus was born, and ordered the Massacre of the Innocents in response to his birth. Blackburn & Holford-Strevens fix Herod's death shortly before Passover in 4 BC,[13] and say that those who accept the story of the Massacre of the Innocents sometimes associate the star that led the Biblical Magi with the planetary conjunction of 15 September 7 BC or Halley's comet of 12 BC; even historians who do not accept the Massacre accept the birth under Herod as a tradition older than the written gospels.[14]
The Gospel of Luke (1:5) states that John the Baptist was at least conceived, if not born, under Herod, and that Jesus was conceived while John's mother was in the sixth month of her pregnancy (1:26). Luke's Gospel also states that Jesus was born during the reign of Augustus and while Cyrenius (or Quirinius) was the governor of Syria (2:1–2). Blackburn and Holford-Strevens[13] indicate Cyrenius/Quirinius' governorship of Syria began in AD 6, which is incompatible with conception in 4 BC, and say that "St. Luke raises greater difficulty....Most critics therefore discard Luke".[14] Some scholars rely on John's Gospel to place Christ's birth in c.18 BC.[14]
[edit] Popularization
The first historian or chronicler to use Anno Domini as his primary dating mechanism was Victor of Tonnenna, an African chronicler of the 6th century. A few generations later, the Anglo-Saxon historian Bede, who was familiar with the work of Dionysius, also used Anno Domini dating in his Ecclesiastical History of the English People, finished in 731. In this same history, he was the first to use the Latin equivalent of before Christ and established the standard for historians of no year zero, even though he used zero in his computus. Both Dionysius and Bede regarded Anno Domini as beginning at the incarnation of Jesus, but "the distinction between Incarnation and Nativity was not drawn until the late 9th century, when in some places the Incarnation epoch was identified with Christ's conception, i.e., the Annunciation on 25 March" (Annunciation style).[15]
On the continent of Europe, Anno Domini was introduced as the era of choice of the Carolingian Renaissance by Alcuin. This endorsement by Charlemagne and his successors popularizing the usage of the epoch and spreading it throughout the Carolingian Empire ultimately lies at the core of the system's prevalence until present times.
Outside the Carolingian Empire, Spain continued to date by the Era of the Caesars, or Spanish Era, which began counting from 38 BC, well into the Middle Ages,. The Era of Martyrs, which numbered years from the accession of Diocletian in 284, who launched the last yet most severe persecution of Christians, was used by the Church of Alexandria, and is still used officially by the Coptic church. It also used to be used by the Ethiopian church. Another system was to date from the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, which as early as Hippolytus and Tertullian was believed to have occurred in the consulate of the Gemini (AD 29), which appears in the occasional medieval manuscript. Most Syriac manuscripts written at the end of the 19th century still gave the date in the end-note using the "year of the Greeks" (Anno Graecorum = Seleucid era).[citation needed]
Even though Anno Domini was in widespread use by the 9th century, Before Christ (or its equivalent) did not become widespread until the late 15th century.[16]
[edit] Synonyms
[edit] Common Era
Main article: Common Era
Anno Domini is sometimes referred to as the Common Era, Christian Era or Current Era (abbreviated as C.E. or CE). CE is often preferred by those who desire a term unrelated to religious conceptions of time. For example, Cunningham and Starr (1998) write that "B.C.E./C.E. ... do not presuppose faith in Christ and hence are more appropriate for interfaith dialog than the conventional B.C./A.D." The People's Republic of China, founded in 1949, adopted Western years, calling that era gōngyuán (公元) which literally means Common Era.
[edit] Anno Salutis
Anno Salutis (Latin: "in the year of salvation") was the term sometimes used in place of Anno Domini until the 18th century. In all other respects it operated on the same epoch, reference date, which is the Incarnation of Jesus. It was used by fervent Christians to spread the message that the birth of Jesus saved mankind from eternal damnation. It was often used in a more elaborate form such as Anno Nostrae Salutis (meaning: "in the year of our salvation"), Anno Salutis Humanae (meaning: "in the year of the salvation of men"), or Anno Reparatae Salutis (meaning: "in the year of accomplished salvation").
[edit] Numbering of years
Common usage omits year zero. This creates a problem with some scientific calculations. Accordingly, in astronomical year numbering, a zero year is added before AD 1, and the 'AD' and 'BC' designation is dropped. In keeping with 'standard decimal numbering', a minus sign '−' is added for years before year zero: so counting down from year 2 would give 2, 1, 0, −1, −2, and so on. This results in a one-year shift between the two systems (eg −1 equals 2 BC).[17]
[edit] Notes and references
Notes:
1. ^ May also be spelled "Anno Domine."
2. ^ "Anno Domini". Merriam Webster Online Dictionary. (2003). Merriam-Webster. Retrieved on 2008-02-03. “Etymology: Medieval Latin, in the year of the Lord”
3. ^ Blackburn & Holford-Strevens p. 782
4. ^ The approximation of the year in the old Persian calendar attributed to Omar Khayyám is 365.2424 days, which is very close to the vernal equinox year, but requires a 33-year cycle. The definition by Milutin Milanković, used in the "revised Julian calendar", is 365.2422 days, which is very close to the mean tropical year, but uses unequal long-period cycles.
5. ^ a b CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: General Chronology
6. ^ The Complete Idiot's Guide to Biblical Mysteries. Retrieved on 2008-01-16. Ryan, Donald P. (2000). The Complete Idiot's Guide to Biblical Mysteries. Alpha Books, p 15. ISBN 002863831X.
7. ^ Roger S. Bagnall and Klaas A. Worp, Chronological Systems of Byzantine Egypt, Leiden, Brill, 2004.
8. ^ Nineteen year cycle of Dionysius
9. ^ Blackburn & Holford-Strevens 2003, 778.
10. ^ Blackburn & Holford-Strevens 2003, 778–9.
11. ^ Bede, 731, Book 1, Chapter 2, first sentence.
12. ^ Doggett 1992, 579
13. ^ a b Blackburn & Holford-Strevens 2003, 770
14. ^ a b c Blackburn & Holford-Strevens 2003, 776
15. ^ Blackburn & Holford-Strevens 881.
16. ^ Werner Rolevinck in Fasciculus temporum (1474) used Anno ante xpi nativitatem (in the year before the birth of Christ) for all years between Creation and Jesus. "xpi" is the Greek χρι in Latin letters, which is a cryptic abbreviation for christi. This phrase appears upside down in the center of recto folios (right hand pages). From Jesus to Pope Sixtus IV he usually used Anno christi or its cryptic form Anno xpi (on verso folios—left hand pages). He used Anno mundi alongside all of these terms for all years.
17. ^ Doggett, 1992, p. 579
References:
* Abate, Frank R(ed.) (1997). Oxford Pocket Dictionary and Thesaurus, American ed., New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-513097-9.
* Bede. (731). Historiam ecclesiasticam gentis Anglorum. Accessed 2007-12-07.
* Blackburn, Bonnie; Leofranc Holford-Strevens (2003). The Oxford companion to the Year: An exploration of calendar customs and time-reckoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-214231-3. (reprinted & corrected, originally published 1999)
* Cunningham, Philip A; Starr, Arthur F (1998). Sharing Shalom: A Process for Local Interfaith Dialogue Between Christians and Jews. Paulist Press. ISBN 0-8091-3835-2.
* Declercq, Georges (2000). Anno Domini: The origins of the Christian era. Turnhout: Brepols. ISBN 2-503-51050-7. (despite beginning with 2, it is English)
* Declercq, G. "Dionysius Exiguus and the Introduction of the Christian Era". Sacris Erudiri 41 (2002): 165–246. An annotated version of part of Anno Domini.
* Doggett. (1992). "Calendars" (Ch. 12), in P. Kenneth Seidelmann (Ed.) Explanatory supplement to the astronomical almanac. Sausalito, CA: University Science Books. ISBN 0-935702-68-7.
* Richards, E. G. (2000). Mapping Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-286205-7.
* Riggs, John (January-February 2003). Whatever happened to B.C. and A.D., and why?. United Church News. Retrieved on December 19, 2005.
* Ryan, Donald P. (2000). The Complete Idiot's Guide to Biblical Mysteries. Alpha Books, p 15. ISBN 002863831X.
* TaiwanCalender Class (System.Globalization). Microsoft Corp. (2006). Retrieved on September 10, 2006.
[edit] External links
Look up AD, Anno Domini in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.
* The Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "General Chronology"
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Posted by dannoynted1 at 9:32 AM 0 comments Links to this post
Labels: Angels from the Promised land
Friday, December 28, 2007
Gateway~Is Deep in the Heart of Texas~ God Bless Texas
The stars at night are big and bright
(clap, clap, clap, clap),
Deep in the heart of Texas.
The prairie sky is wide and high
(clap, clap, clap, clap),
Deep in the heart of Texas.
The sage in bloom is like perfume
(clap, clap, clap, clap),
Deep in the heart of Texas.
Reminds me of the one I love
(clap, clap, clap, clap),
Deep in the heart of Texas.
The coyotes wail along the trail
(clap, clap, clap, clap),
Deep in the heart of Texas.
The rabbits rush around the brush
(clap, clap, clap, clap),
Deep in the heart of Texas.
Posted by dannoynted1 at 1:42 AM 0 comments Links to this post
Labels: Angels from the Promised land, Desert of the dead
Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)
Wednesday, March 19, 2008
Thursday, March 06, 2008
Dear LULAC, AGIF and all Humanitarian Advocacy Proponents
Dear LULAC, AGIF and all Humanitarian Advocacy Proponents,
We at Los Kenedeños have learned of serious allegations concerning the practice of euthanasia and premature babies of poor families who have no health insurance. Locally, we should pay close attention to the Ponce case, scheduled for trial in Nueces County Court at Law #1 March. Medical records and court documents indicate that at least one Corpus Christi hospital is routinely euthanatizing premature babies of poor Hispanic families who do not have health insurance (see "People Magazine" April 25, 2005 “Controversy: Grieving parents Sylvia and Manuel Ponce claim a doctor euthanized their premature baby” http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,1049168,00.html).
David Ponce, a beautiful little boy struggling to live, was given a massive lethal injection of narcotic to save the hospital money for his expensive care. Other infants who had identical medical conditions but who had insurance were not given the same injection that was used to kill David Ponce. Attorneys, including Abernathy in Corpus Christi and Scully in Dallas, have worked very hard to cover this up for almost eight years. Just ask them and you'll see what I mean.
Surely LULAC, The American GI Forum & Public Policy oppose this practice?
We place this matter in your very capable hands in preparation, please review all public
documents and make sure our presence (in numbers) and support is exuded at all hearings, trials AND IN THE PUBLIC EYE AS WELL.
It is our duty to keep the public informed and to stand up for those who cant stand up for themselves.
Tell the people "what is really going on" with their Healthcare.
Monday, March 03, 2008
Nueces Democrats: Hegemony: Power, Culture & Ideology: Lencho Rendon: The Pimping Out Of The President & Hillary
Nueces Democrats: Hegemony: Power, Culture & Ideology: Lencho Rendon: The Pimping Out Of The President & Hillary:
"It is a simple choice, vote for Joe or vote for the Solomonista."
"It is a simple choice, vote for Joe or vote for the Solomonista."
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
Is this the "Integrity" of "Education of CCISD" ~ Administrative Policy of Principal's "private Policy" used4 Public Educationlaw BILLS...
1 Comment - Show Original Post
Blogger Jaime Kenedeño said...
Dear Sirs,
There is a concerning precedent being set with the Nueces County JP Courts and specifically the Precinct 2 Place 2 Court Located in Flour Bluff ISD. Any objections or contesting of legal issues are first reacted to in “a playing of ignorance” and ADA’s pick the file up and retreat to a back room for “legal advice”. What is interesting from a layman’s perspective is whom did the ADA confer with in the back room? After all, the Republican JP is not a “Legally Trained” member of the Texas Bar Association but he does pack a Political Agenda. So why would an Attorney be asking a non-attorney for “Legal Advice”? Any citing of the Texas Statutes are vehemently disallowed as the intimidation tactics of pointing fingers, threats of going to jail and the filing of extraneous charges materialize. Most any average citizen would defer and succumb, but to their astonishment this was not the case for one family who stood up and called their bluff.
Initially, in October 8, 2006 the family lost their patriarch and the children were devastated. The children were out of school all except for one day that week and the parents turned in an excuse. On October 16, 2006 charges were filed for Non-attendance and Parent contributing to non-attendance. Any absences occurring after October 16, 2006 are excluded (by law) as evidence for this particular case filed on October 16, 2006. The calculations are in error as the record inaccurately reflects the absences as unexcused when in fact the written excuses were submitted in a timely manner and are verifiable. It is possibly a simple error however, it lingers uncorrected.
In the case filed on October 16, 2006 satisfactory attendance evidence has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Superintendent Scott Eliff (*statement to be submitted in evidence). Also the statements made in writing by King High School Assistant Principal Lisa Trevino are in violation of the Civil Rights afforded to all Americans as the statement demonstrates retaliation by a KHS Administrator for pleading NOT GUILTY to the allegations made on October 16, 2006. (**To be submitted into evidence). Is it the norm to claim a student in non-compliance with attendance policies simply because he pleaded NOT GUILTY? Furthermore, is not it a violation of one’s Civil Rights to claim a student in non-compliance with attendance policies simply because he pleaded NOT GUILTY?
February 26, 2008 2:03 AM
Blogger Jaime Kenedeño said...
Dear Sirs,
There is a concerning precedent being set with the Nueces County JP Courts and specifically the Precinct 2 Place 2 Court Located in Flour Bluff ISD. Any objections or contesting of legal issues are first reacted to in “a playing of ignorance” and ADA’s pick the file up and retreat to a back room for “legal advice”. What is interesting from a layman’s perspective is whom did the ADA confer with in the back room? After all, the Republican JP is not a “Legally Trained” member of the Texas Bar Association but he does pack a Political Agenda. So why would an Attorney be asking a non-attorney for “Legal Advice”? Any citing of the Texas Statutes are vehemently disallowed as the intimidation tactics of pointing fingers, threats of going to jail and the filing of extraneous charges materialize. Most any average citizen would defer and succumb, but to their astonishment this was not the case for one family who stood up and called their bluff.
Initially, in October 8, 2006 the family lost their patriarch and the children were devastated. The children were out of school all except for one day that week and the parents turned in an excuse. On October 16, 2006 charges were filed for Non-attendance and Parent contributing to non-attendance. Any absences occurring after October 16, 2006 are excluded (by law) as evidence for this particular case filed on October 16, 2006. The calculations are in error as the record inaccurately reflects the absences as unexcused when in fact the written excuses were submitted in a timely manner and are verifiable. It is possibly a simple error however, it lingers uncorrected.
In the case filed on October 16, 2006 satisfactory attendance evidence has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Superintendent Scott Eliff (*statement to be submitted in evidence). Also the statements made in writing by King High School Assistant Principal Lisa Trevino are in violation of the Civil Rights afforded to all Americans as the statement demonstrates retaliation by a KHS Administrator for pleading NOT GUILTY to the allegations made on October 16, 2006. (**To be submitted into evidence). Is it the norm to claim a student in non-compliance with attendance policies simply because he pleaded NOT GUILTY? Furthermore, is not it a violation of one’s Civil Rights to claim a student in non-compliance with attendance policies simply because he pleaded NOT GUILTY?
February 26, 2008 2:03 AM
Saturday, February 23, 2008
An opportunity is thus a type of liberty or freedom for it involves the absence of prohibitions or obstacles limiting what agents may or can do.......
ISEC 2005
Inclusive and Supportive Education Congress
International Special Education Conference
Inclusion: Celebrating Diversity?
1st - 4th August 2005. Glasgow, Scotland
home
about the conference
programme
registration
accommodation
contact
Equality of Opportunity as a Rationale for Inclusive Education
Dr. Christian Liesen
Institute for Special Education – University of Zurich, Switzerland
Hirschengraben 48, CH-8001 Zurich
liesen@isp.unizh.ch
This paper seeks to discuss whether the principle of equality of opportunity could serve as a rationale for inclusive education. The first section aims at positioning the topic within the inclusive education discourse, narrowing down the scope. The second section presents a brief analysis of the notion of ‘equality of opportunity’ as well as some of its implications, while the third section addresses the question of how we are to know whether opportunities are equal. The last section seeks to draw some conclusions with respect to inclusive education. – It should be pointed out that the paper is solely meant for discussion.
1. The case for inclusive education: reasons and rationales
Many arguments have been brought forward to strengthen the case for inclusive education. Yet it is not always easy to follow the lines of reasoning, and little reflection is needed to notice certain contradictions and ambiguities and a good deal of eclecticism in the literature. The crux is, as Alan Dyson observed, that
(i)nclusion is different from many other fields of inquiry in that it is premised on an answer rather than a question. That ‘answer’, of course, is that inclusive education is superior in one or other way to non-inclusive education. The strength in this position is that it enables a relatively young field to define and advance itself in the face of considerable hostility. (…) The danger, however, is that it becomes all too easy for thinking on inclusion to descend from analysis to polemic, and for certain values and beliefs to become ossified, ultimately to the detriment of those marginalized groups on whose interests the inclusion movement claims to act. ( Dyson, 1999, p. 43f. )
Dyson has suggested to distinguish between two different but intersecting dimensions of the inclusive education movement: One is primarily concerned with providing a rationale for inclusion, whereas the other concentrates on the realisation of inclusion. Each dimension can again be subdivided into different discourses as follows. A rationale for inclusive education is either sought with reference to rights and social justice or by rigorously questioning the efficacy of special education (while claiming the superiority of inclusive education). The realisation of inclusion is frequently discussed either with respect to the political struggle for the implementation of inclusive education, or it is concerned with what inclusive education looks like inpractice (cf. Dyson, 1999, pp. 38-43 ). It is safe to say that these two dimensions / four discourses deliver a felicitous depiction of the inclusion debate’s crucial building blocks.
This paper is concerned with adumbrating the question whether equality of opportunity could serve as a rationale for inclusive education. It belongs, hence, in the context of the rights and social justice discourse. Concededly, the most important (and most interesting) question would actually be how the different building blocks interrelate, or ought to interact, in order to achieve progress in the field. Dyson does offer some very sensible and perspicacious suggestions on this (cf. ibid., pp. 44-48). The line of reasoning chosen here, by contrast, will allow only for a few rather cautious remarks in the final part of the paper. Proposed is the idea of merging, in a way, ethical considerations and empirical research in order to substantiate the case for inclusive education. As a consequence, some fundamental policy issues will emerge, alongside certain difficulties inherent to the rhetoric of inclusion.
2. Equality of opportunity
Let us shed, as a first step, some light on the principle of equality of opportunity. Peter Westen (1990) has presented an illuminating formal analysis. He states that opportunity
designates both a single concept and a multiplicity of conceptions. Each opportunity is like every other in that all opportunities reflect a certain formal relationship among agents, obstacles, and goals; but each opportunity also differs from other opportunities in that each is a relationship among particular agents, particular obstacles, and particular goals. ( Westen, 1990 , p. 171, italics added)
This may seem simple enough. Nevertheless, an important point with respect to the rhetoric of opportunity is already implied here: When opportunities are stated as a reason for, say, political action, speakers often do not specify the particular agents, obstacles, and/or goals they have in mind. Such a speech may still meet with approval although the underlying conceptions of speaker and listener may turn out to be radically different on closer examination. Rhetorical difficulties like these should be kept in mind.
Equal opportunities do not lead to equal outcomes. On the contrary, equal opportunities lead to inequality. There is sense in which a strong commitment to equality of opportunity is incompatible with equality of outcomes, and a society that aims at equalising opportunity is very different from a society that aims at equalising outcomes. The reason is that
(a)n ‘opportunity’ to attain a goal is a chance to attain a goal, not necessarily a guarantee of attaining it. Insofar as people have opportunities that are less than guarantees of what they wish, some of them will inevitably attain goals that others fail to attain. To create equal opportunity, therefore, is virtually always to allow people ‘to become unequal by competing against [their] fellows.’ (Westen, 1990, p. 176f.)
That equality of opportunity leads to inequality has some deeper implications. It can be argued that opportunities express and deliver a certain kind of liberty or freedom which is essential for society and which can not be achieved otherwise. Equality of opportunity is indispensable. T.D. Campbell enunciates the point as follows:
An opportunity may be said to occur when an agent is in a situation in which he may choose whether or not to perform some effortful act which is considered to be desirable in itself or as means to the attainment of some goal which is considered to be desirable. An opportunity is thus a type of liberty or freedom for it involves the absence of prohibitions or obstacles limiting what agents may or can do or acquire. […] (A)n opportunity is something which the agent may or may not take advantage of depending on whether or not he chooses to do so. One of the points about describing a situation as an opportunity is that this indicates that the outcome of the situation depends in part on the choices made by the person who has the opportunity. Opportunities can always be missed or passed up, neglected or rejected. Of course I may be forced to have an opportunity (as when I was compelled to go to school) but it is not an opportunity which I am forced to have if the attainment of the desired goal does not depend to some extent on my choices, that is, for instance, if whether or not I become educated as distinct from go to school, does not depend to some extent on my own volitions. If education as such could be compelled then we would not speak of educational opportunity, at least not in those cases where it is compelled. ( Campbell, 1975, p. 51/54, italics added )
It is true, of course, that not all opportunities are of particular concern to us. People do not care for all kinds of opportunities; they care first and foremost for educational and occupational opportunities. A ‘fair’ or ‘equal’ distribution of opportunities is relevant and vital especially in these domains. What comes into play here, then, is that equality of opportunity must be seen as a matter of distributive justice. A just society will usually seek to equalise opportunities in the sense of distributing them fair an equal. It is worth noticing, however, that opportunities can not be created or distributed at will. Westen notes that
creating one opportunity may mean denying another. Thus, whenever a society creates an opportunity by removing an obstacle that affects people differentially, it denies people the opportunity to benefit from the differential. And, whenever a society creates an opportunity by removing human obstacles, it denies people the opportunity to exploit those obstacles. This does not mean that societies should refrain from creating opportunities. It means, rather, that … the significant question for opportunity is not ‘Whether opportunity?’ but ‘Which opportunities?’ (Westen, 1990, p. 171)
Consequently and in most cases, with equality of opportunity as a rationale for inclusive education, apparently interests will have to be balanced. The interests of those who are excluded from participating effectively in society – of which the education system forms an essential part – will have to be weighed against the interests of those who are successful within such a framework and ‘benefit from the given differential’. A society will therefore have to deliberate about equalising opportunities, which is, ultimately, a democratic process (belonging to the realisation dimension).
It should be emphasized, however, that when a mismatch between a person’s situation and what may be called the dominant cooperative framework of society occurs, the results may be devastating. Being excluded from participating in the most basic interactions and cooperation of society strongly calls for compensation and adjustment. On this basic level, the interest in inclusion will by and large outweigh the interests of those who may be deprived of being as successful as they could be otherwise. If people are denied basic opportunities in this sense, they will normally be in the position of making strong claims in the cause of justice. But the question of particular interest is then, of course, ‘How do we know they are denied these opportunities?’, or more general, ‘How do we know whether opportunities are equal or not?’, e.g. in an education system.
3. How do we know when opportunities are equal?
We have seen so far that we should focus our attention on educational and occupational opportunities; that opportunities secure individual liberty and freedom and lead, consequently, to inequalities; and that equality of opportunity is a matter of distributive justice and may result in strong claims of justice in at least some cases. But on what grounds is it legitimate to judge whether opportunities are equal or not? How do we assess and evaluate equality of opportunity, especially with respect to inclusive education?
There is a substantive answer to this question. Any inquiry into whether opportunities in a given society are equal or not – or within parts of a society, such as the education system – will have to start from ascertainable inequalities under the prevailing circumstances. These inequalities will have to be sufficiently and adequately described in a way that most people would agree is accurate. (We will look at an example in a moment.)
The crucial point to be addressed will be whether or not the portrayed inequalities indicate that the principle of equality of opportunity has been violated. Onora O’Neill (1977) has argued that two different positions suggest themselves. One may be called the ‘formal’ (or ‘liberal’) position. It stresses that inequalities are due to the fact that people may choose to or refrain from taking advantage of the opportunities at hand. The members of society may be extremely unequal in educational and occupational attainment, but if so, it must be the result of the varying capacities, volitions, and desires of those to whom the respective selection procedures are applied. Once the distributive and selective procedures are fair, there is nothing left to complain about. As O’Neill points out,
(s)uch an ‘equal-opportunity society’ would … not be characterized by equal incomes or equal property holdings or equal standards of living or of education. (…) Equal opportunity in the formal sense does not ensure equal success or equal health or equal status, but only the fair application of the rules governing the pursuit of such goods. This is the equality of opportunity of … a society in which there are winners and losers, and in which winning appears often as merited by the winners and losing as deserved by the losers – for did they not all have equal opportunity to win? ( O'Neill, 1977 , p. 180)
The other position may be called the ‘substantive’ (or ‘egalitarian’) position. It stresses that inequalities must not indicate a disproportionate success of certain social groups in a society. Instead, all major social groups – but not all individuals – must fare equally well.
An equal-opportunity society on the substantive view is one in which the success rates of all major social groups are the same. (…) A strong commitment to substantive equality of opportunity demands that any under-representation of some group in some line of employment / income group / educational group be due solely to the unmanipulated choice of members of that group. (…) Substantively equal opportunity is achieved when the success rates of certain major social groups – such as the two sexes, various ethnic groups and perhaps various age groups – are equalized. It is not breached when there are large differences between the most- and least-successful members of these groups, provided that there are equally large differences between the most- and least-successful members of other major social groups. It is not true in a society which aims at substantively equal opportunities that all individuals have the same chance of any given type of success. For individuals are all members of many differently defined groups, and substantive equality of opportunity seeks only to equalize their chances qua members of certain major social groups; it seeks to eliminate inter-group differences, but not to alter intra-group ones. ( O'Neill, 1977 , p. 181-83)
This position is ready to acknowledge that people’s perspectives in life are not exclusively ascribable to a person’s capacities, volitions, and desires. As a matter of fact, there are disadvantages which are undeserved and beyond individual control, such as being disabled or of old age. The ‘substantive’ position is concerned with identifying adequate characteristics of major social groups to enable sound comparisons and call for compensation where needed.
To illustrate, a good example are some results from the PISA study (cf. www.pisa.oecd.org). The OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an internationally standardised assessment that was jointly developed by the participating countries (30 OECD member states plus 13 associated countries in the first assessment in 2000; at least 58 countries will participate in the next assessment in 2006). PISA claims to assess “how far students near the end of compulsory education have acquired some of the knowledge and skills that are essential for full participation in society.” The idea is to give information about the capacities and the potential of education systems. Does an education system prepare students well?
It is only recently that OECD has published some findings concerning equity and quality in the light of the PISA 2000 results. The report states that
(i)n sum, PISA 2000 results show that students in integrated education systems perform, on average, better than those in selective education systems, and that their educational performance is less dependent on their background. Many factors may be at play here. A higher average performance suggests that the more heterogeneous student groups or classes in integrated education systems could have a beneficial effect for the lower-performing students. Also, the flexibility offered by an integrated system may allow students to improve their performance while keeping their academic options open. ( OECD, 2005 , p. 89)
In the main findings section, the report reads:
A striking result was the advantage that comprehensive education systems appear to have in terms of student performance (quality). PISA 2000 results suggest that the performance of students enrolled in comprehensive education systems is less dependent on their socio-economic background. ( ibid., p. 94)
From the perspective of equality of opportunity, it is not so much the aspect of performance (‘quality’) that is of interest here but rather the aspect of uncoupling socio-economic background and performance (‘equity’). There are some countries – Germany is a sad example – in which the social background of a student has a very strong impact (‘predictive power’) on student performance. This means, to put the matter bluntly, that it is not a student’s capacity to perform that determines what he or she will achieve, but first and foremost his or her socio-economic background. The result is that students with a low social background are manifestly underrepresented on the higher levels of the education system.
The ‘liberal’ position has no option but to ascribe this situation to individual factors, say, motivation or ability. This is highly implausible, at least in the case of countries that have had to experience a rude awakening by PISA, such as Germany or Switzerland. ‘Substantive’ equality of opportunity, on the other hand, is precisely concerned with cases like these: Members of a major social group – i.e., students with a lower socio-economic background – are disadvantaged due to factors that are undeserved and beyond individual control, while other groups display disproportionate success. This does call for an equalisation of opportunities.
4. Equality of opportunity and inclusive education: some considerations
In the final part of this paper, I would like to draw some conclusions concerning equality of opportunity and inclusive education.
First, I think that equality of opportunity can serve as a rationale for inclusive education if and only if inclusion is understood in the sense of equity. This would mean to adopt the substantive view of equal opportunity, and will require to provide empirical evidence to show that a major social group of society is indeed undeservedly disadvantaged. It would also mean to suggest that some form of inclusive education is the right course of action to take.
Second, to provide a rationale for inclusive education is obviously very different from the realisation of inclusive education. It should be kept in mind that other interests will have to be allowed for as well and that there might be considerable opposition, even if the claims could compellingly be shown to be legitimate ones. This should not belie the fact, however, that being in the position to provide a rationale for inclusive education is very different from simply claiming that it is right. It is precisely because different and mutually incompatible interests are involved that arguments have to be provided (and there are some highly interesting contributions in this kind of spirit, for example Booth & Ainscow, 1998; Pijl, Meijer & Hegarty, 1997; Vitello & Mithaug, 1998 ).
Third, if this idea bears any validity at all, it has to be pointed out that the rhetoric of inclusion tends to disguise some fundamental points here, especially in relation to policy. For example, the rhetoric of ‘celebrating diversity’ tends to downplay the fact that different legitimate interests are involved and have to be balanced. Cause for concern gives also the factor that any policy perspective will always have to operate along the lines of defining social groups. It may come as a surprise that this is not only due to administrative reasons (cf. Dever, 1990 ) but is also demanded from an ethically informed perspective. There are no claims of distributive justice – and hence no rationale for inclusive education – without the construction of social groups. The talk of heterogeneity isn’t much help in these matters, the more so as it quite often blurs who is thought to be the target group of inclusion within the inclusive education discourse.
Fourth, it will be as unavoidable as it is fruitful to strive to merge ethical considerations and empirical research in some respect. The idea behind this is that an empirical basis is indispensable in order to substantiate claims, while at the same time ethical considerations are indispensable to provide a sensible interpretative framework for empirical findings and to draw sound conclusions. One main feature of these arguments, reasons and rationales is that they must be eligible to convince others on grounds they can not reasonably reject – to convincingly argue the case.
Fifth, there seems to be a broad consensus that inclusive education has to be conceptualised as a general education topic, not as another issue of special education. Equality of opportunity might help us to engross the implications of what this actually means. It might help us to see the big picture.
Sixth, it has to be pointed out that there is not one choice in these matters, but many. There is no unequivocal course of action to take. Dyson’s proposal to talk not of inclusion, but of inclusions, and to seek not a single form but a wide range of inclusive practice and organisation (1999, p. 46), deserves a good deal more of attention. Moreover, I think the field of special education should be very serious about Seamus Hegarty’s remark that inclusive education has to be about changing and modifying system in a way that preserves all its strengths (cf. Hegarty, 1998 , p. 156).
References
BOOTH T. & AINSCOW M. (eds.) (1998) From Them to Us. An International Study of Inclusion in Education. London: Routledge.
CAMPBELL T.D. (1975) Equality of Opportunity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75, 51-68.
DEVER R.B. (1990) Defining Mental Retardation from an Instructional Perspective. Mental Retardation 28 (3), 147-53.
DYSON A. (1999) Inclusion and Inclusions: Theories and Discourses in Inclusive Education. IN Daniels H. & Garner P. (eds.) World Yearbook of Education 1999: Inclusive Education. London: Kogan, 36-53.
HEGARTY S. (1998) Challenges to Inclusive Education: A European Perspective. IN Vitello S. & Mithaug D.E. (eds.) Inclusive Schooling: National and International Perspectives. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 151-65.
O'NEILL O. (1977) How Do We Know When Opportunities Are Equal? IN Vetterling-Braggin M., Elliston F.A. & English J. (eds.) Feminism and Philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 177-89.
OECD (2005) School Factors Related to Quality and Equity. Results from Pisa 2000. Paris: OECD.
PIJL S.J., MEIJER C. & HEGARTY S. (eds.) (1997) Inclusive Education: A Global Agenda. London: Routledge.
VITELLO S. & MITHAUG D.E. (eds.) (1998) Inclusive Schooling. National and International Perspectives. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
WESTEN P. (1990) Speaking of Equality. An Analysis of the Rhetorical Force of Equality in Moral and Legal Discourse. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
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The University of Strathclyde Association of Directors of Education in Scotland NASEN Inclusive Technology Ltd Greater Glasgow & Clyde Valley Tourist Board Virtual Staff College
Inclusive and Supportive Education Congress
International Special Education Conference
Inclusion: Celebrating Diversity?
1st - 4th August 2005. Glasgow, Scotland
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Equality of Opportunity as a Rationale for Inclusive Education
Dr. Christian Liesen
Institute for Special Education – University of Zurich, Switzerland
Hirschengraben 48, CH-8001 Zurich
liesen@isp.unizh.ch
This paper seeks to discuss whether the principle of equality of opportunity could serve as a rationale for inclusive education. The first section aims at positioning the topic within the inclusive education discourse, narrowing down the scope. The second section presents a brief analysis of the notion of ‘equality of opportunity’ as well as some of its implications, while the third section addresses the question of how we are to know whether opportunities are equal. The last section seeks to draw some conclusions with respect to inclusive education. – It should be pointed out that the paper is solely meant for discussion.
1. The case for inclusive education: reasons and rationales
Many arguments have been brought forward to strengthen the case for inclusive education. Yet it is not always easy to follow the lines of reasoning, and little reflection is needed to notice certain contradictions and ambiguities and a good deal of eclecticism in the literature. The crux is, as Alan Dyson observed, that
(i)nclusion is different from many other fields of inquiry in that it is premised on an answer rather than a question. That ‘answer’, of course, is that inclusive education is superior in one or other way to non-inclusive education. The strength in this position is that it enables a relatively young field to define and advance itself in the face of considerable hostility. (…) The danger, however, is that it becomes all too easy for thinking on inclusion to descend from analysis to polemic, and for certain values and beliefs to become ossified, ultimately to the detriment of those marginalized groups on whose interests the inclusion movement claims to act. ( Dyson, 1999, p. 43f. )
Dyson has suggested to distinguish between two different but intersecting dimensions of the inclusive education movement: One is primarily concerned with providing a rationale for inclusion, whereas the other concentrates on the realisation of inclusion. Each dimension can again be subdivided into different discourses as follows. A rationale for inclusive education is either sought with reference to rights and social justice or by rigorously questioning the efficacy of special education (while claiming the superiority of inclusive education). The realisation of inclusion is frequently discussed either with respect to the political struggle for the implementation of inclusive education, or it is concerned with what inclusive education looks like inpractice (cf. Dyson, 1999, pp. 38-43 ). It is safe to say that these two dimensions / four discourses deliver a felicitous depiction of the inclusion debate’s crucial building blocks.
This paper is concerned with adumbrating the question whether equality of opportunity could serve as a rationale for inclusive education. It belongs, hence, in the context of the rights and social justice discourse. Concededly, the most important (and most interesting) question would actually be how the different building blocks interrelate, or ought to interact, in order to achieve progress in the field. Dyson does offer some very sensible and perspicacious suggestions on this (cf. ibid., pp. 44-48). The line of reasoning chosen here, by contrast, will allow only for a few rather cautious remarks in the final part of the paper. Proposed is the idea of merging, in a way, ethical considerations and empirical research in order to substantiate the case for inclusive education. As a consequence, some fundamental policy issues will emerge, alongside certain difficulties inherent to the rhetoric of inclusion.
2. Equality of opportunity
Let us shed, as a first step, some light on the principle of equality of opportunity. Peter Westen (1990) has presented an illuminating formal analysis. He states that opportunity
designates both a single concept and a multiplicity of conceptions. Each opportunity is like every other in that all opportunities reflect a certain formal relationship among agents, obstacles, and goals; but each opportunity also differs from other opportunities in that each is a relationship among particular agents, particular obstacles, and particular goals. ( Westen, 1990 , p. 171, italics added)
This may seem simple enough. Nevertheless, an important point with respect to the rhetoric of opportunity is already implied here: When opportunities are stated as a reason for, say, political action, speakers often do not specify the particular agents, obstacles, and/or goals they have in mind. Such a speech may still meet with approval although the underlying conceptions of speaker and listener may turn out to be radically different on closer examination. Rhetorical difficulties like these should be kept in mind.
Equal opportunities do not lead to equal outcomes. On the contrary, equal opportunities lead to inequality. There is sense in which a strong commitment to equality of opportunity is incompatible with equality of outcomes, and a society that aims at equalising opportunity is very different from a society that aims at equalising outcomes. The reason is that
(a)n ‘opportunity’ to attain a goal is a chance to attain a goal, not necessarily a guarantee of attaining it. Insofar as people have opportunities that are less than guarantees of what they wish, some of them will inevitably attain goals that others fail to attain. To create equal opportunity, therefore, is virtually always to allow people ‘to become unequal by competing against [their] fellows.’ (Westen, 1990, p. 176f.)
That equality of opportunity leads to inequality has some deeper implications. It can be argued that opportunities express and deliver a certain kind of liberty or freedom which is essential for society and which can not be achieved otherwise. Equality of opportunity is indispensable. T.D. Campbell enunciates the point as follows:
An opportunity may be said to occur when an agent is in a situation in which he may choose whether or not to perform some effortful act which is considered to be desirable in itself or as means to the attainment of some goal which is considered to be desirable. An opportunity is thus a type of liberty or freedom for it involves the absence of prohibitions or obstacles limiting what agents may or can do or acquire. […] (A)n opportunity is something which the agent may or may not take advantage of depending on whether or not he chooses to do so. One of the points about describing a situation as an opportunity is that this indicates that the outcome of the situation depends in part on the choices made by the person who has the opportunity. Opportunities can always be missed or passed up, neglected or rejected. Of course I may be forced to have an opportunity (as when I was compelled to go to school) but it is not an opportunity which I am forced to have if the attainment of the desired goal does not depend to some extent on my choices, that is, for instance, if whether or not I become educated as distinct from go to school, does not depend to some extent on my own volitions. If education as such could be compelled then we would not speak of educational opportunity, at least not in those cases where it is compelled. ( Campbell, 1975, p. 51/54, italics added )
It is true, of course, that not all opportunities are of particular concern to us. People do not care for all kinds of opportunities; they care first and foremost for educational and occupational opportunities. A ‘fair’ or ‘equal’ distribution of opportunities is relevant and vital especially in these domains. What comes into play here, then, is that equality of opportunity must be seen as a matter of distributive justice. A just society will usually seek to equalise opportunities in the sense of distributing them fair an equal. It is worth noticing, however, that opportunities can not be created or distributed at will. Westen notes that
creating one opportunity may mean denying another. Thus, whenever a society creates an opportunity by removing an obstacle that affects people differentially, it denies people the opportunity to benefit from the differential. And, whenever a society creates an opportunity by removing human obstacles, it denies people the opportunity to exploit those obstacles. This does not mean that societies should refrain from creating opportunities. It means, rather, that … the significant question for opportunity is not ‘Whether opportunity?’ but ‘Which opportunities?’ (Westen, 1990, p. 171)
Consequently and in most cases, with equality of opportunity as a rationale for inclusive education, apparently interests will have to be balanced. The interests of those who are excluded from participating effectively in society – of which the education system forms an essential part – will have to be weighed against the interests of those who are successful within such a framework and ‘benefit from the given differential’. A society will therefore have to deliberate about equalising opportunities, which is, ultimately, a democratic process (belonging to the realisation dimension).
It should be emphasized, however, that when a mismatch between a person’s situation and what may be called the dominant cooperative framework of society occurs, the results may be devastating. Being excluded from participating in the most basic interactions and cooperation of society strongly calls for compensation and adjustment. On this basic level, the interest in inclusion will by and large outweigh the interests of those who may be deprived of being as successful as they could be otherwise. If people are denied basic opportunities in this sense, they will normally be in the position of making strong claims in the cause of justice. But the question of particular interest is then, of course, ‘How do we know they are denied these opportunities?’, or more general, ‘How do we know whether opportunities are equal or not?’, e.g. in an education system.
3. How do we know when opportunities are equal?
We have seen so far that we should focus our attention on educational and occupational opportunities; that opportunities secure individual liberty and freedom and lead, consequently, to inequalities; and that equality of opportunity is a matter of distributive justice and may result in strong claims of justice in at least some cases. But on what grounds is it legitimate to judge whether opportunities are equal or not? How do we assess and evaluate equality of opportunity, especially with respect to inclusive education?
There is a substantive answer to this question. Any inquiry into whether opportunities in a given society are equal or not – or within parts of a society, such as the education system – will have to start from ascertainable inequalities under the prevailing circumstances. These inequalities will have to be sufficiently and adequately described in a way that most people would agree is accurate. (We will look at an example in a moment.)
The crucial point to be addressed will be whether or not the portrayed inequalities indicate that the principle of equality of opportunity has been violated. Onora O’Neill (1977) has argued that two different positions suggest themselves. One may be called the ‘formal’ (or ‘liberal’) position. It stresses that inequalities are due to the fact that people may choose to or refrain from taking advantage of the opportunities at hand. The members of society may be extremely unequal in educational and occupational attainment, but if so, it must be the result of the varying capacities, volitions, and desires of those to whom the respective selection procedures are applied. Once the distributive and selective procedures are fair, there is nothing left to complain about. As O’Neill points out,
(s)uch an ‘equal-opportunity society’ would … not be characterized by equal incomes or equal property holdings or equal standards of living or of education. (…) Equal opportunity in the formal sense does not ensure equal success or equal health or equal status, but only the fair application of the rules governing the pursuit of such goods. This is the equality of opportunity of … a society in which there are winners and losers, and in which winning appears often as merited by the winners and losing as deserved by the losers – for did they not all have equal opportunity to win? ( O'Neill, 1977 , p. 180)
The other position may be called the ‘substantive’ (or ‘egalitarian’) position. It stresses that inequalities must not indicate a disproportionate success of certain social groups in a society. Instead, all major social groups – but not all individuals – must fare equally well.
An equal-opportunity society on the substantive view is one in which the success rates of all major social groups are the same. (…) A strong commitment to substantive equality of opportunity demands that any under-representation of some group in some line of employment / income group / educational group be due solely to the unmanipulated choice of members of that group. (…) Substantively equal opportunity is achieved when the success rates of certain major social groups – such as the two sexes, various ethnic groups and perhaps various age groups – are equalized. It is not breached when there are large differences between the most- and least-successful members of these groups, provided that there are equally large differences between the most- and least-successful members of other major social groups. It is not true in a society which aims at substantively equal opportunities that all individuals have the same chance of any given type of success. For individuals are all members of many differently defined groups, and substantive equality of opportunity seeks only to equalize their chances qua members of certain major social groups; it seeks to eliminate inter-group differences, but not to alter intra-group ones. ( O'Neill, 1977 , p. 181-83)
This position is ready to acknowledge that people’s perspectives in life are not exclusively ascribable to a person’s capacities, volitions, and desires. As a matter of fact, there are disadvantages which are undeserved and beyond individual control, such as being disabled or of old age. The ‘substantive’ position is concerned with identifying adequate characteristics of major social groups to enable sound comparisons and call for compensation where needed.
To illustrate, a good example are some results from the PISA study (cf. www.pisa.oecd.org). The OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an internationally standardised assessment that was jointly developed by the participating countries (30 OECD member states plus 13 associated countries in the first assessment in 2000; at least 58 countries will participate in the next assessment in 2006). PISA claims to assess “how far students near the end of compulsory education have acquired some of the knowledge and skills that are essential for full participation in society.” The idea is to give information about the capacities and the potential of education systems. Does an education system prepare students well?
It is only recently that OECD has published some findings concerning equity and quality in the light of the PISA 2000 results. The report states that
(i)n sum, PISA 2000 results show that students in integrated education systems perform, on average, better than those in selective education systems, and that their educational performance is less dependent on their background. Many factors may be at play here. A higher average performance suggests that the more heterogeneous student groups or classes in integrated education systems could have a beneficial effect for the lower-performing students. Also, the flexibility offered by an integrated system may allow students to improve their performance while keeping their academic options open. ( OECD, 2005 , p. 89)
In the main findings section, the report reads:
A striking result was the advantage that comprehensive education systems appear to have in terms of student performance (quality). PISA 2000 results suggest that the performance of students enrolled in comprehensive education systems is less dependent on their socio-economic background. ( ibid., p. 94)
From the perspective of equality of opportunity, it is not so much the aspect of performance (‘quality’) that is of interest here but rather the aspect of uncoupling socio-economic background and performance (‘equity’). There are some countries – Germany is a sad example – in which the social background of a student has a very strong impact (‘predictive power’) on student performance. This means, to put the matter bluntly, that it is not a student’s capacity to perform that determines what he or she will achieve, but first and foremost his or her socio-economic background. The result is that students with a low social background are manifestly underrepresented on the higher levels of the education system.
The ‘liberal’ position has no option but to ascribe this situation to individual factors, say, motivation or ability. This is highly implausible, at least in the case of countries that have had to experience a rude awakening by PISA, such as Germany or Switzerland. ‘Substantive’ equality of opportunity, on the other hand, is precisely concerned with cases like these: Members of a major social group – i.e., students with a lower socio-economic background – are disadvantaged due to factors that are undeserved and beyond individual control, while other groups display disproportionate success. This does call for an equalisation of opportunities.
4. Equality of opportunity and inclusive education: some considerations
In the final part of this paper, I would like to draw some conclusions concerning equality of opportunity and inclusive education.
First, I think that equality of opportunity can serve as a rationale for inclusive education if and only if inclusion is understood in the sense of equity. This would mean to adopt the substantive view of equal opportunity, and will require to provide empirical evidence to show that a major social group of society is indeed undeservedly disadvantaged. It would also mean to suggest that some form of inclusive education is the right course of action to take.
Second, to provide a rationale for inclusive education is obviously very different from the realisation of inclusive education. It should be kept in mind that other interests will have to be allowed for as well and that there might be considerable opposition, even if the claims could compellingly be shown to be legitimate ones. This should not belie the fact, however, that being in the position to provide a rationale for inclusive education is very different from simply claiming that it is right. It is precisely because different and mutually incompatible interests are involved that arguments have to be provided (and there are some highly interesting contributions in this kind of spirit, for example Booth & Ainscow, 1998; Pijl, Meijer & Hegarty, 1997; Vitello & Mithaug, 1998 ).
Third, if this idea bears any validity at all, it has to be pointed out that the rhetoric of inclusion tends to disguise some fundamental points here, especially in relation to policy. For example, the rhetoric of ‘celebrating diversity’ tends to downplay the fact that different legitimate interests are involved and have to be balanced. Cause for concern gives also the factor that any policy perspective will always have to operate along the lines of defining social groups. It may come as a surprise that this is not only due to administrative reasons (cf. Dever, 1990 ) but is also demanded from an ethically informed perspective. There are no claims of distributive justice – and hence no rationale for inclusive education – without the construction of social groups. The talk of heterogeneity isn’t much help in these matters, the more so as it quite often blurs who is thought to be the target group of inclusion within the inclusive education discourse.
Fourth, it will be as unavoidable as it is fruitful to strive to merge ethical considerations and empirical research in some respect. The idea behind this is that an empirical basis is indispensable in order to substantiate claims, while at the same time ethical considerations are indispensable to provide a sensible interpretative framework for empirical findings and to draw sound conclusions. One main feature of these arguments, reasons and rationales is that they must be eligible to convince others on grounds they can not reasonably reject – to convincingly argue the case.
Fifth, there seems to be a broad consensus that inclusive education has to be conceptualised as a general education topic, not as another issue of special education. Equality of opportunity might help us to engross the implications of what this actually means. It might help us to see the big picture.
Sixth, it has to be pointed out that there is not one choice in these matters, but many. There is no unequivocal course of action to take. Dyson’s proposal to talk not of inclusion, but of inclusions, and to seek not a single form but a wide range of inclusive practice and organisation (1999, p. 46), deserves a good deal more of attention. Moreover, I think the field of special education should be very serious about Seamus Hegarty’s remark that inclusive education has to be about changing and modifying system in a way that preserves all its strengths (cf. Hegarty, 1998 , p. 156).
References
BOOTH T. & AINSCOW M. (eds.) (1998) From Them to Us. An International Study of Inclusion in Education. London: Routledge.
CAMPBELL T.D. (1975) Equality of Opportunity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75, 51-68.
DEVER R.B. (1990) Defining Mental Retardation from an Instructional Perspective. Mental Retardation 28 (3), 147-53.
DYSON A. (1999) Inclusion and Inclusions: Theories and Discourses in Inclusive Education. IN Daniels H. & Garner P. (eds.) World Yearbook of Education 1999: Inclusive Education. London: Kogan, 36-53.
HEGARTY S. (1998) Challenges to Inclusive Education: A European Perspective. IN Vitello S. & Mithaug D.E. (eds.) Inclusive Schooling: National and International Perspectives. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 151-65.
O'NEILL O. (1977) How Do We Know When Opportunities Are Equal? IN Vetterling-Braggin M., Elliston F.A. & English J. (eds.) Feminism and Philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 177-89.
OECD (2005) School Factors Related to Quality and Equity. Results from Pisa 2000. Paris: OECD.
PIJL S.J., MEIJER C. & HEGARTY S. (eds.) (1997) Inclusive Education: A Global Agenda. London: Routledge.
VITELLO S. & MITHAUG D.E. (eds.) (1998) Inclusive Schooling. National and International Perspectives. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
WESTEN P. (1990) Speaking of Equality. An Analysis of the Rhetorical Force of Equality in Moral and Legal Discourse. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
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The University of Strathclyde Association of Directors of Education in Scotland NASEN Inclusive Technology Ltd Greater Glasgow & Clyde Valley Tourist Board Virtual Staff College
Monday, February 11, 2008
DeLay claimed that too many people of color had volunteered to join the military in order to escape poverty, thus leaving no room for patriotic conser
NATIONAL NEWS
'Chicken Hawks' are Flapping their Wings over War with Iraq
by George E. Curry
That loud clucking sound you hear coming from the nation’s capital did not originate at KFC, Popeye’s, or the neighborhood wing joint. It’s coming from chicken hawks, those now thirsting for a war with Iraq but were chicken when it was their turn to serve in the military.
Let’s start with “Dubya.” The president joined the Texas Air National Guard in 1968 rather than serve in the military. He apparently used the connections of his father, who was a congressman and war hero, to join the Guard, leapfrogging thousands whose names were already on the waiting list.
Vice President Dick Chaney obtained student deferments and then a marital deferment to avoid Vietnam. He explained that he had “other priorities” than military service. Attorney General John Ashcroft did not serve, opting to get a deferment to teach business at Southwest Missouri State University.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was a Navy pilot and flight instructor from 1954 to 1957 but did not see combat.
Although Republican leaders in Congress are more hawkish than Democrats, that’s in rhetoric only. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt and House Minority Whip David Bonior served in the military. On the Republican side, Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott, Senate Minority Whip Don Nickles, Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, House Majority Leader Dick Armey and House Majority Whip Tom DeLay did not serve.
DeLay claimed that too many people of color had volunteered to join the military in order to escape poverty, thus leaving no room for patriotic conservatives like him. So instead of fighting in Vietnam, DeLay declared war on roaches and bugs as an exterminator.
Some of the most famous talking heads on television also did not serve in the military, including George Will, Bill O’Reilly, Bill Kristol, Charles Krauthammer, Pat Buchanan, Alan Keys and Rush Limbaugh, the royal pain who said he did not serve because of “anal cysts.”
Other notable chicken hawks are Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson, Senator Joe Lieberman, Gov. Jeb Bush of Florida, Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, Rep. Bob “B-1” Dornan, former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, former Secretary of Education William Bennett and former congressman and ex-vice presidential candidate Jack Kemp, who failed his physical exam but was healthy enough to play professional football. (For an extensive list of chicken hawks on the Internet, go to the New Hampshire Gazette’s site at www.nhgazette.com/chickenhawks.html or www.awolbush.com.)
Interestingly, the most vocal opponents of a war against Iraq are retired military generals, including Brent Scowcroft, the elder Bush’s national security adviser and Gulf War Commander Norman Schwarzkopf.
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, a retired Army general, wrote in “My American Journey,” his autobiography: “I particularly condemn the way our political leaders supplied the manpower for that [Vietnam] war. The policies – determining who would be drafted and who would be deferred, who would serve and who would escape, who would die and who would live – were an antidemocratic disgrace.”
In the interest of full disclosure, when I was editor of “The Aurora,” my school paper at Knoxville College in Tennessee, I was among 250 student leaders who signed a “We Won’t Go” to Vietnam petition that was submitted to President Richard Nixon. Of those, 12 were invited to hold a new conference in Washington, D.C. And two of us appeared on the “Today Show” to state our case.
On national TV, I expressed opposition to the Vietnam War on moral grounds and stated that I would refuse to go to Vietnam if drafted. I stated that I was willing to suffer the consequences of my decision and explained that I would not flee to Canada to avoid whatever government authorities had in store for me.
My Selective Service Board wasn’t exactly pleased with my position and sought to have me drafted. It was a big relief, especially to my family, when doctors at the induction center discovered that I have enlarged lymph nodes, which disqualified me for military service.
I am proud of the stand I took more than three decades ago. Although I objected to our involvement in the war, I respected the men who had volunteered to fight in Vietnam, including some of my close friends. We made different choices and had the courage of our convictions. But I have no respect for chicken hawks who avoided military service but are now eager to send other parents’ kids to war.
If we go to war, it’s unlikely that the brunt of that conflict will be felt by sons and daughters of the wealthy or politically connected.
Colin Powell also wrote in his autobiography, “I am angry that so many of the sons of the powerful and well placed and so many professional athletes (who were probably healthier than any of us) managed to wangle slots in Reserve or National Guard units. Of the many tragedies of Vietnam, this raw class discrimination strikes me as the most damaging to the ideal that all Americans are created equal and owe equal allegiance to their country.”
Powell published that seven years ago. Today, he is working for the Number One Chicken Hawk.
George E. Curry is editor-in-chief of the NNPA News Service and BlackPressUSA.com.
####
'Chicken Hawks' are Flapping their Wings over War with Iraq
by George E. Curry
That loud clucking sound you hear coming from the nation’s capital did not originate at KFC, Popeye’s, or the neighborhood wing joint. It’s coming from chicken hawks, those now thirsting for a war with Iraq but were chicken when it was their turn to serve in the military.
Let’s start with “Dubya.” The president joined the Texas Air National Guard in 1968 rather than serve in the military. He apparently used the connections of his father, who was a congressman and war hero, to join the Guard, leapfrogging thousands whose names were already on the waiting list.
Vice President Dick Chaney obtained student deferments and then a marital deferment to avoid Vietnam. He explained that he had “other priorities” than military service. Attorney General John Ashcroft did not serve, opting to get a deferment to teach business at Southwest Missouri State University.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was a Navy pilot and flight instructor from 1954 to 1957 but did not see combat.
Although Republican leaders in Congress are more hawkish than Democrats, that’s in rhetoric only. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt and House Minority Whip David Bonior served in the military. On the Republican side, Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott, Senate Minority Whip Don Nickles, Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, House Majority Leader Dick Armey and House Majority Whip Tom DeLay did not serve.
DeLay claimed that too many people of color had volunteered to join the military in order to escape poverty, thus leaving no room for patriotic conservatives like him. So instead of fighting in Vietnam, DeLay declared war on roaches and bugs as an exterminator.
Some of the most famous talking heads on television also did not serve in the military, including George Will, Bill O’Reilly, Bill Kristol, Charles Krauthammer, Pat Buchanan, Alan Keys and Rush Limbaugh, the royal pain who said he did not serve because of “anal cysts.”
Other notable chicken hawks are Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson, Senator Joe Lieberman, Gov. Jeb Bush of Florida, Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, Rep. Bob “B-1” Dornan, former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, former Secretary of Education William Bennett and former congressman and ex-vice presidential candidate Jack Kemp, who failed his physical exam but was healthy enough to play professional football. (For an extensive list of chicken hawks on the Internet, go to the New Hampshire Gazette’s site at www.nhgazette.com/chickenhawks.html or www.awolbush.com.)
Interestingly, the most vocal opponents of a war against Iraq are retired military generals, including Brent Scowcroft, the elder Bush’s national security adviser and Gulf War Commander Norman Schwarzkopf.
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, a retired Army general, wrote in “My American Journey,” his autobiography: “I particularly condemn the way our political leaders supplied the manpower for that [Vietnam] war. The policies – determining who would be drafted and who would be deferred, who would serve and who would escape, who would die and who would live – were an antidemocratic disgrace.”
In the interest of full disclosure, when I was editor of “The Aurora,” my school paper at Knoxville College in Tennessee, I was among 250 student leaders who signed a “We Won’t Go” to Vietnam petition that was submitted to President Richard Nixon. Of those, 12 were invited to hold a new conference in Washington, D.C. And two of us appeared on the “Today Show” to state our case.
On national TV, I expressed opposition to the Vietnam War on moral grounds and stated that I would refuse to go to Vietnam if drafted. I stated that I was willing to suffer the consequences of my decision and explained that I would not flee to Canada to avoid whatever government authorities had in store for me.
My Selective Service Board wasn’t exactly pleased with my position and sought to have me drafted. It was a big relief, especially to my family, when doctors at the induction center discovered that I have enlarged lymph nodes, which disqualified me for military service.
I am proud of the stand I took more than three decades ago. Although I objected to our involvement in the war, I respected the men who had volunteered to fight in Vietnam, including some of my close friends. We made different choices and had the courage of our convictions. But I have no respect for chicken hawks who avoided military service but are now eager to send other parents’ kids to war.
If we go to war, it’s unlikely that the brunt of that conflict will be felt by sons and daughters of the wealthy or politically connected.
Colin Powell also wrote in his autobiography, “I am angry that so many of the sons of the powerful and well placed and so many professional athletes (who were probably healthier than any of us) managed to wangle slots in Reserve or National Guard units. Of the many tragedies of Vietnam, this raw class discrimination strikes me as the most damaging to the ideal that all Americans are created equal and owe equal allegiance to their country.”
Powell published that seven years ago. Today, he is working for the Number One Chicken Hawk.
George E. Curry is editor-in-chief of the NNPA News Service and BlackPressUSA.com.
####
Tuesday, February 05, 2008
Congress needs to just toss it in the trash and start over.......
America is racing headlong into a serious recession (depression?) and Bush doesn't have a clue what to do about it. He clearly shows this with the ridiculous budget he has sent to Congress. He has proposed a budget that will set a record level of deficit spending, but does very little for the ordinary Americans who need help.
It will give many Americans a few hundred dollars in a one-time giveaway, but this does nothing to solve the problems these people face -- rising prices, stagnant wages, record home foreclosures, disappearing jobs, and a broken healthcare system. The only real effect this "stimulus package" will have is to increase profits for the corporations (who are already making more money than ever).
Then, to make things worse, he wants to make permanent trillions of dollars in tax cuts for the wealthy. Again, this is helping the people who don't need any help, but does nothing for those who need help.
Then he wants to give the military-industrial complex a huge 7.5% increase, while demanding that most social programs settle for 1% (far below the inflation rate) and others get cut or eliminated. Again, he's helping the rich and punishing everyone else.
He even wants to slash education funds by $3.2 billion. Of course these cuts will have to be made up by middle and working class people on the state and local level -- the very people the recession is hitting the hardest.
And he doesn't leave the elderly out either while dishing out the pain. He wants to cut Medicare by another $200 billion. This program is already so underfunded by Republicans that two-thirds of doctors refuse to take new Medicare patients. How will an elderly person be able to find a doctor after those new cuts?
I have to stop before I throw up. Bush's new budget is an abomination. It is not even worth amending. Congress needs to just toss it in the trash and start over.
It is time for Democrats to finally stand up to Bush and act to protect ordinary Americans. They must say no to every part of this insane budget.
Labels: budget, Bush
It will give many Americans a few hundred dollars in a one-time giveaway, but this does nothing to solve the problems these people face -- rising prices, stagnant wages, record home foreclosures, disappearing jobs, and a broken healthcare system. The only real effect this "stimulus package" will have is to increase profits for the corporations (who are already making more money than ever).
Then, to make things worse, he wants to make permanent trillions of dollars in tax cuts for the wealthy. Again, this is helping the people who don't need any help, but does nothing for those who need help.
Then he wants to give the military-industrial complex a huge 7.5% increase, while demanding that most social programs settle for 1% (far below the inflation rate) and others get cut or eliminated. Again, he's helping the rich and punishing everyone else.
He even wants to slash education funds by $3.2 billion. Of course these cuts will have to be made up by middle and working class people on the state and local level -- the very people the recession is hitting the hardest.
And he doesn't leave the elderly out either while dishing out the pain. He wants to cut Medicare by another $200 billion. This program is already so underfunded by Republicans that two-thirds of doctors refuse to take new Medicare patients. How will an elderly person be able to find a doctor after those new cuts?
I have to stop before I throw up. Bush's new budget is an abomination. It is not even worth amending. Congress needs to just toss it in the trash and start over.
It is time for Democrats to finally stand up to Bush and act to protect ordinary Americans. They must say no to every part of this insane budget.
Labels: budget, Bush
Friday, January 18, 2008
He demanded equal opportunity for Mexican-American students, who were separated from Anglo students and taught in subpar facilities with inexperience
Garcia's greatest passion: education
By Adriana Garza (Contact)
Originally published 04:33 a.m., January 18, 2008
Updated 04:33 a.m., January 18, 2008
Dr. Hector P. Garcia was born 94 years ago this week in a small southern town in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas, one of seven children born to parents who were teachers.
His life would come to symbolize the hope and activism that marked the Hispanic civil rights struggle, and his actions helped to change the Hispanic experience in the country forever. Birthday celebrations in Corpus Christi and San Antonio on Thursday honored that vision and life mission.
He was passionate about many things -- practicing medicine, fighting for equal rights for Hispanic veterans -- but his greatest passion may have been for education.
Garcia, founder of the American GI Forum, developed a love for learning early in life.
His family -- parents Jose and Faustina Garcia and his six siblings -- fled from revolution-torn Mexico to the Rio Grande Valley in 1917.
Jose was forced to leave his teaching career behind and open a dry-goods store to support his family.
But education remained a cornerstone of the Garcia family.
Jose used the edifice of his grocery store as a quasi-schoolroom and taught his children the basics, including English.
Young Hector was sometimes difficult to corral for his lessons. His love for baseball often rivaled his love for learning and served as a distraction. But life always came back to learning.
Garcia would go on to earn a bachelor's degree from the University of Texas and a medical degree from the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston. His siblings all became educated professionals.
Education became a focus for Garcia and his American GI Forum. The civil rights leader took on school segregation and became an important and public figure on the issue. He demanded equal opportunity for Mexican-American students, who were separated from Anglo students and taught in subpar facilities with inexperienced teachers.
At home, he was just as demanding when it came to schooling. For Dr. Hector, education was more than just a cause, it was a deeply personal commitment.
Cecilia Akers, one of Dr. Hector's three daughters, said her father set high standards for his children, especially when it came to grades and schoolwork.
"He was so intense about us finishing school," Akers said. "When we were 8 and 9 he was already trying to get us to focus on what we were going to do for a career."
Coming home from school with a B or a C was bad news for the Garcia children. Dr. Hector expected all A's.
While growing up with such high expectations was difficult, Akers, a physical therapist, now appreciates her father's passion for education. In keeping with his motto, "Education is freedom and freedom is everyone's business," Garcia believed it was education that would ensure his daughters' independence, Akers said.
"He wanted us all to be independent," Akers said. "He didn't want us to have to depend on a man or anyone to support us. He was really ahead of his time."
Former staff reporter and Corpus Christi native Adriana Garza is pursuing a master's degree in political science at Texas A&M; University-Kingsville. Contact her at adriana.garza@tamuk.edu.
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By Adriana Garza (Contact)
Originally published 04:33 a.m., January 18, 2008
Updated 04:33 a.m., January 18, 2008
Dr. Hector P. Garcia was born 94 years ago this week in a small southern town in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas, one of seven children born to parents who were teachers.
His life would come to symbolize the hope and activism that marked the Hispanic civil rights struggle, and his actions helped to change the Hispanic experience in the country forever. Birthday celebrations in Corpus Christi and San Antonio on Thursday honored that vision and life mission.
He was passionate about many things -- practicing medicine, fighting for equal rights for Hispanic veterans -- but his greatest passion may have been for education.
Garcia, founder of the American GI Forum, developed a love for learning early in life.
His family -- parents Jose and Faustina Garcia and his six siblings -- fled from revolution-torn Mexico to the Rio Grande Valley in 1917.
Jose was forced to leave his teaching career behind and open a dry-goods store to support his family.
But education remained a cornerstone of the Garcia family.
Jose used the edifice of his grocery store as a quasi-schoolroom and taught his children the basics, including English.
Young Hector was sometimes difficult to corral for his lessons. His love for baseball often rivaled his love for learning and served as a distraction. But life always came back to learning.
Garcia would go on to earn a bachelor's degree from the University of Texas and a medical degree from the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston. His siblings all became educated professionals.
Education became a focus for Garcia and his American GI Forum. The civil rights leader took on school segregation and became an important and public figure on the issue. He demanded equal opportunity for Mexican-American students, who were separated from Anglo students and taught in subpar facilities with inexperienced teachers.
At home, he was just as demanding when it came to schooling. For Dr. Hector, education was more than just a cause, it was a deeply personal commitment.
Cecilia Akers, one of Dr. Hector's three daughters, said her father set high standards for his children, especially when it came to grades and schoolwork.
"He was so intense about us finishing school," Akers said. "When we were 8 and 9 he was already trying to get us to focus on what we were going to do for a career."
Coming home from school with a B or a C was bad news for the Garcia children. Dr. Hector expected all A's.
While growing up with such high expectations was difficult, Akers, a physical therapist, now appreciates her father's passion for education. In keeping with his motto, "Education is freedom and freedom is everyone's business," Garcia believed it was education that would ensure his daughters' independence, Akers said.
"He wanted us all to be independent," Akers said. "He didn't want us to have to depend on a man or anyone to support us. He was really ahead of his time."
Former staff reporter and Corpus Christi native Adriana Garza is pursuing a master's degree in political science at Texas A&M; University-Kingsville. Contact her at adriana.garza@tamuk.edu.
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Thursday, January 17, 2008
Any "indicating" as defined by the Texas Family Code Section 51.03(b) 1 ~ CCISD is guilty of fraud
(b) A child taken into custody may be detained prior to hearing on the petition only if:
1. the child is likely to abscond or be removed from the court's jurisdiction;
2. suitable supervision, care, or protection for the child is not being provided by a parent, guardian, custodian, or other person;
3. the child has no parent, guardian, custodian, or other person able to return the child to the court when required;
4. the child may be dangerous to himself or herself or the child may threaten the safety of the public if released;
5. the child has previously been found to be a delinquent child or has previously been convicted of a penal offense punishable by a term in jail or prison and is likely to commit an offense if released; or
6. the child's detention is required under subsection (f), below.
(c) If the child is not released, a request for detention hearing shall be made and promptly presented to the court, and an informal detention hearing shall be held promptly, but not later than the second working day after the child is taken into custody. If the child is taken into custody on a Friday or Saturday, then the detention hearing shall be held on the first working day after the child is taken into custody.
(d) A release of a child to an adult must be conditioned on the agreement of the adult to be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to an order of contempt by the court if the adult, after notification, is unable to produce the child at later proceedings.
(e) If a child being released under this section is expelled from school in a county with a population greater than 125,000, the release shall be conditioned on the child's attending a juvenile justice alternative education program pending a deferred prosecution or formal court disposition of the child's case.
(f) A child who is alleged to have engaged in delinquent conduct and to have used, possessed, or exhibited a firearm in the commission of the offense shall be detained until the child is released at the direction of the judge of the juvenile court, a substitute judge, or a referee appointed, including an oral direction by telephone, or until a detention hearing is held.
1. the child is likely to abscond or be removed from the court's jurisdiction;
2. suitable supervision, care, or protection for the child is not being provided by a parent, guardian, custodian, or other person;
3. the child has no parent, guardian, custodian, or other person able to return the child to the court when required;
4. the child may be dangerous to himself or herself or the child may threaten the safety of the public if released;
5. the child has previously been found to be a delinquent child or has previously been convicted of a penal offense punishable by a term in jail or prison and is likely to commit an offense if released; or
6. the child's detention is required under subsection (f), below.
(c) If the child is not released, a request for detention hearing shall be made and promptly presented to the court, and an informal detention hearing shall be held promptly, but not later than the second working day after the child is taken into custody. If the child is taken into custody on a Friday or Saturday, then the detention hearing shall be held on the first working day after the child is taken into custody.
(d) A release of a child to an adult must be conditioned on the agreement of the adult to be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to an order of contempt by the court if the adult, after notification, is unable to produce the child at later proceedings.
(e) If a child being released under this section is expelled from school in a county with a population greater than 125,000, the release shall be conditioned on the child's attending a juvenile justice alternative education program pending a deferred prosecution or formal court disposition of the child's case.
(f) A child who is alleged to have engaged in delinquent conduct and to have used, possessed, or exhibited a firearm in the commission of the offense shall be detained until the child is released at the direction of the judge of the juvenile court, a substitute judge, or a referee appointed, including an oral direction by telephone, or until a detention hearing is held.
Tuesday, January 01, 2008
Nueces Democrats: Robert Zamora:A Man of Strength & Stability ; Winning Back The Nueces County Democratic Party For All South Texas Democrats
Nueces Democrats: Robert Zamora:A Man of Strength & Stability ; Winning Back The Nueces County Democratic Party For All South Texas Democrats
Zamora Announces for Party Chair
Zamora Announces for Party Chair
Updated: Jan 1, 2008 12:31 AM
A local attorney has announced he is running for chairman of the Nueces County Democratic Party.
There has been talk that several people might run. On Monday, attorney Robert Zamora officially announced that he has filed for the position, which is now held by Alex Garcia Jr.
"I have not only experience as a lawyer operating my own business for close to 30 years," Zamora said. "What I would like to do is lend the energy and the experience that I have to the operation of the Democratic Party here in Nueces County.
The race will be decided in the state presidential primary in March.
Tuesday, October 02, 2007
Texas State Representative House District 33: Solomon P. Ortiz Jr. Defeats Mikal Watts at his Own Game. Or Perhaps GOD intervened.
A BurkaBlog: A Kenedeno Responds to Paul Burka Article with a knockout in the Article Entitled, "Solomon P. Ortiz Jr. Defeats Mikal Watts at his Own Game. Or Perhaps GOD intervened.: "August 22, 2006"
Solly's opponent claimed he had endorsements in writing and he in fact had them but that is the key, ....... he "had them". We are dealing with human beings who will change their mind if and when they see a better deal. Now whether that means more honest, more for the voter, or getting their eyes poked with the Silver Tongue talking like a multi ventriloquist that is for us to find out. Endorsements dont mean anything unless it is on the day they vote. Ask the NY Mets about that phenomenon as they will sit at home this October after leading the whole season.
BurkaBlog:Some Insight Into WATT Endorsements Mean in South Texas?
Solly's opponent claimed he had endorsements in writing and he in fact had them but that is the key, ....... he "had them". We are dealing with human beings who will change their mind if and when they see a better deal. Now whether that means more honest, more for the voter, or getting their eyes poked with the Silver Tongue talking like a multi ventriloquist that is for us to find out. Endorsements dont mean anything unless it is on the day they vote. Ask the NY Mets about that phenomenon as they will sit at home this October after leading the whole season.
BurkaBlog:Some Insight Into WATT Endorsements Mean in South Texas?
Education is our freedom, Fund education not i incarceration our we will get other representation!
Private Agenda funding puppet politicians publically policy provisions
Posted on September 12, 2007 at 03:37:54 AM by Oh Banking in the Cayman USA
AUSTIN -- Texas has spent more than $250,000 to provide security for Gov. Rick Perry and his wife during international trips, state records show.
Most of the trips were touted as economic development missions, but the security tally also includes a Grand Cayman vacation last year and a 2004 trip to the Bahamas with campaign donors that the governor's office said was to discuss education.
The Texas Department of Public Safety has spent $259,428 on the Governor Protective Detail for nine trips since 2004, according to figures obtained by Texas newspapers.
When it comes to Perry's direct expenses, travel costs are normally covered by a privately funded economic development program overseen by his office, business contributions or his campaign. But the state covers security costs.
"Whenever the governor travels, we go with him. That's the way it's been with past governors," DPS spokesman Tom Vinger said.
Perry spokesman Robert Black said the governor's travel is important to advancing his economic development agenda.
"As the leader of the 10th largest economy in the world, the governor has made job creation and economic development a cornerstone of his administration, and that means ... bringing jobs to this state, whether from inside our own country or from around the world," Black said Tuesday.
The DPS highway patrol budget, financed mostly by the state gasoline tax and vehicle registration fees, funds the security detail.
http://www.caller.com/news/2007/aug/9/perrys-security-on-trips-costs-259k/
Replies:
Posted on September 12, 2007 at 03:37:54 AM by Oh Banking in the Cayman USA
AUSTIN -- Texas has spent more than $250,000 to provide security for Gov. Rick Perry and his wife during international trips, state records show.
Most of the trips were touted as economic development missions, but the security tally also includes a Grand Cayman vacation last year and a 2004 trip to the Bahamas with campaign donors that the governor's office said was to discuss education.
The Texas Department of Public Safety has spent $259,428 on the Governor Protective Detail for nine trips since 2004, according to figures obtained by Texas newspapers.
When it comes to Perry's direct expenses, travel costs are normally covered by a privately funded economic development program overseen by his office, business contributions or his campaign. But the state covers security costs.
"Whenever the governor travels, we go with him. That's the way it's been with past governors," DPS spokesman Tom Vinger said.
Perry spokesman Robert Black said the governor's travel is important to advancing his economic development agenda.
"As the leader of the 10th largest economy in the world, the governor has made job creation and economic development a cornerstone of his administration, and that means ... bringing jobs to this state, whether from inside our own country or from around the world," Black said Tuesday.
The DPS highway patrol budget, financed mostly by the state gasoline tax and vehicle registration fees, funds the security detail.
http://www.caller.com/news/2007/aug/9/perrys-security-on-trips-costs-259k/
Replies:
Wednesday, September 19, 2007
CECILIA GARCIA AKERS: THANK YOU MR. ZUNIGA
THANK YOU MR. ZUNIGA FOR FORWARDING THE INFORMATION REGARDING THE
CELEBRATION OF DR. HECTOR P. GARCIA'S RECOGNITION DAY. IT IS GOING TO
BE A JOYFUL WEEK FOR THE GARCIA FAMILY AS MANY COMMUNITIES NOT ONLY IN
CORPUS CHRISTI, BUT AROUND THE STATE OF TEXAS WILL BE REMEMBERING ALL
MY FATHER'S MANY ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND THE IMPACT HE MADE ON THEIR
LIVES. MY MOTHER MRS. HECTOR P. GARCIA WILL BE ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON
AT LA SIESTA CAFE WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GARCIA FAMILY, INCLUDING
MYSELF, DR. CP GARCIA, AND DR. DALIA GARCIA. IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARD,
WE WILL BE ATTENDING THE CELEBRATIONS AT JA GARCIA SCHOOL, AND MILLER
HIGH SCHOOL. WE LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AT SOME OF THE EVENTS.
THANK YOU.
CECILIA GARCIA AKERS
ANGEL ZUNIGA
Chair, Central Committee
CELEBRATION OF DR. HECTOR P. GARCIA'S RECOGNITION DAY. IT IS GOING TO
BE A JOYFUL WEEK FOR THE GARCIA FAMILY AS MANY COMMUNITIES NOT ONLY IN
CORPUS CHRISTI, BUT AROUND THE STATE OF TEXAS WILL BE REMEMBERING ALL
MY FATHER'S MANY ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND THE IMPACT HE MADE ON THEIR
LIVES. MY MOTHER MRS. HECTOR P. GARCIA WILL BE ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON
AT LA SIESTA CAFE WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GARCIA FAMILY, INCLUDING
MYSELF, DR. CP GARCIA, AND DR. DALIA GARCIA. IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARD,
WE WILL BE ATTENDING THE CELEBRATIONS AT JA GARCIA SCHOOL, AND MILLER
HIGH SCHOOL. WE LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AT SOME OF THE EVENTS.
THANK YOU.
CECILIA GARCIA AKERS
Esteemed Forumeers and Friends:
The American GI Forum of the US Central Committee of Corpus Christi cordially requests your presence during the week of 16-22 September to honor our founder Dr. Hector P. Garcia. Events start on Monday, 17 September 2007, at 9:00 a.m. at Seaside Memorial Park with a morning memorial service.
There will be a luncheon in honor of Dr. Hector P Garcia on the designated recognition day (19 Sept 2007) by the State of Texas at La Siesta Cafe from 11 AM - 1 PM, at 2331 Agnes St. (361-882-0814). Hosting Chapters are Beatrice Perez Robstown Women's Chapter and the Dr. Hector P. Garcia Founders Chapter.
There is a 75 seat capacity so please call Dr. Dalia Garcia at 993-6319 to RSVP.
The American GI Forum of Texas-Pvt. Felix Z. Longoria Chapter of Corpus Christi, Texas will be conducting ceremonies recognizing Dr. Hector P. Garcia per House Concurrent Resolution No. 273 as well as commemorating Hispanic Heritage Month on Wednesday, September 19, 2007 at 11:00 a.m. on the grounds of Three Rivers City Hall.
Contact Santiago Hernandez, Civil Rights Chairman
American GI Forum-Pvt. Felix Z. Longoria Chapter, Corpus Christi, TX
Home Phone: (361) 851-0958
Cell Phone: (361) 249-5222
Email: Mariachi40@Grandecom.Net
Tentative Program Agenda
11:00AM Opening Remarks
Santiago R. Hernandez, Civil Rights Chairman
American GI Forum-Pvt. Felix Z. Longoria Chapter
Corpus Christi, Texas
11:05AM Posting of Colors
American GI Forum Members
11:10AM Pledge of Allegiance
Debbie Salazar, National Chairwoman
American GI Forum of the United States
Denver, Colorado
11:15AM Invocation
Sara Posas, Chaplain
American GI Forum-Pvt. Felix Z. Longoria Chapter
Portland, Texas
11:20AM Welcome Remarks
James Liska, Mayor
Three Rivers, Texas
11:25AM Hispanic Heritage Month
Moices Cortez, Hispanic Employment Program Manager
Federal Correctional Institution-Three Rivers, Texas
11:30AM Introduction of Guest Speaker
Willie Perez, Commander
American GI Forum-Pvt. Felix Z. Longoria Chapter
Corpus Christi, Texas
11:35AM Guest Speaker
Wanda Garcia, Daughter of Dr. Hector P. Garcia
Austin, Texas
11:50AM Closing Remarks
Paul Herrera, State Commander
American GI Forum of Texas
San Antonio, Texas
The Johnny Canales International Forum invites you to the Community Leaders Banquet to honor Dr. Hector P. Garcia. The event will be held on Wednesday 19 Sept 2007 at the Richard M. Borchard Regional Fairgrounds in Robstown. There will be no tickets sold at the door. For more information call (361) 241-4535. The reception will start at 6:00 p.m. and the banquet will follow at 7:00 p.m. Honored guest are:
Juan "Chuy" Hinojosa Solomon Ortiz, Jr. Juan Garcia
State Senator State Representative State Representative
Abel Herrero Juan Manuel Escobar Yvonne Gonzalez Toureilles
State Representative State Representative State Representative
Other Honored Guests:
Nelda Martinez Mikal Watts Baldemar Gutierrez
City Councilwoman Attorney
Roger Rocha Paul Herrera KZTV Channel 10
Texas State LULAC Commander
Director
The Coastal Bend Area Women's Chapter will hold their event titled Mass in Remembrance of Dr. Hector P. Garcia for Gold Star & Blue Star Mothers on Thursday, September 20, 2007, at 5:30 P.M. Location: St. Patrick's Catholic Church at 3350 Alameda Street, Corpus Christi, Texas
Contact Person: Anna Guzman - (361) 994-8811 or (361) 774-4164
Pews have been reserved for all Gold Star & Blue Star Mothers attending including all Forumeers. Please come out and honor these women and their loved ones who made the ultimate sacrifice defending our rights and the rights of others unable to defend themselves.
ANGEL ZUNIGA
Chair, Central Committee
Hector Garcia celebration is made official
By Mary Ann Cavazos (Contact)
Saturday, September 15, 2007
U.S. Army Pvt. Felix Z. Longoria
Dr. Hector P. Garcia (1968)
CORPUS CHRISTI — Area schools and local American GI Forum chapters will recognize Dr. Hector P. Garcia on Wednesday, the first official state holiday celebration for the civil rights leader.
A resolution passed during the 80th legislative session designated the third Wednesday of September to remember the doctor's life and legacy, but is not a mandatory day off for Texans.
National Hispanic Heritage Month, which begins today, runs through Oct. 15.
Garcia, who founded the American GI Forum in 1948, worked tirelessly for the rights of area Hispanic veterans who were being denied educational, medical and housing benefits promised under the GI Bill of Rights. In 1984, President Ronald Reagan awarded Garcia the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest honor given to a civilian by the president. Garcia died in 1996.
Both J.A. Garcia Elementary School, named for Garcia's brother, and Miller High School will have assemblies on Wednesday to honor him. Garcia's daughter, Cecilia Garcia Akers, and Rep. Juan Garcia, D-Corpus Christi, who both pushed for the legislation, will attend.
The Community Leaders Banquet, presented by the Johnny Canales American GI International Forum, also will pay tribute to Garcia along with several state lawmakers.
Joe Ortiz, the chapter's commander, said the holiday will further educate others, especially students, about Garcia's civil rights efforts.
"I'm glad it's going to schools," Ortiz said. "It's about time more people know about Dr. Garcia."
For the past two weeks, students at Garcia Elementary School have been learning more about Garcia and his contributions, said principal Norma A. De Leon.
"Even though they're very young, I know that it's going to have meaning in their lives," De Leon said.
The school will celebrate its 40th anniversary next year.
The Dr. Hector P. Garcia Founder's Chapter and the Beatrice T. Perez Women's Chapter will join Wednesday for a luncheon.
The Pvt. Felix Z. Longoria Chapter will have a ceremony Wednesday on the Three Rivers City Hall grounds.
"A lot of us wouldn't be where we are today if not for him," said Santiago R. Hernandez, the chapter's civil rights chairman. "He fought, he persevered, and we want to honor him for that."
The chapter's namesake was a U.S. Army soldier killed in the Philippines in 1945. When his body was returned to his hometown of Three Rivers, a funeral home declined to host a wake because he was Hispanic, Longoria's family members have said.
After Garcia and then Texas Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson intervened, Longoria was buried in Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors. The event was highly publicized and helped to cement the American GI Forum as a major civil rights organization.
Contact Mary Ann Cavazos at 886-3623 or cavazosm@caller.com
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Comments
Posted by luckybryan on September 15, 2007 at 6:13 a.m. (Suggest removal)
A promise, kept, is a beautiful thing to see.
Lots of work by soo many people - successful at last.
Thank you, Cecilia Garcia Akers, daughter of Dr. Hector
Thank you, Rep. Juan Garcia, advocate for Dr. Hector
Thank you, Mr. Santiago Hernandez, advocate for Dr. Hector
Posted by intheknow on September 15, 2007 at 7:17 a.m. (Suggest removal)
Last checked the bill passed out of the senate not the house. Sen. Hinojosa is the one who did the work. Please give Sen. Hinojosa due credit.
Posted by claudedunger on September 15, 2007 at 7:25 a.m. (Suggest removal)
To everybody who made this work, congratulations. From those who had the good fortune to be familiar with Dr. Hector's work, understand his love for human dignity, or had the good fortune to have made his acquaintance, thank you.
Posted by camaradas on September 15, 2007 at 1:25 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Thank you for all involved to have this happen. I still hold on dearly to comments and advice given to me by him. Very early on in my teaching career I dedicated teaching my students about him and the great work he helped accomplish. It is so wonderful to know that now even more students will have that knowledge. He was an awesome gentleman.
Posted by luckybryan on September 15, 2007 at 7 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Commander Joe Ortiz, what an awesome role model and leader. Senator Juan "Chuy" Hinojosa, a Vietnam veteran, gets it done for Dr. Hector P. Garcia, a WW II veteran. The wonderful students of J. A. Garcia Elementary School have achieved Perfect Attendance one! maybe two!! times since school started Aug. 27, 2007. Roy Miller High School is the home school of more US military service personnel through the years than any other school in Texas, possibly USA. Its tribute exhibit makes viewers extra-prouder to be Texans first and Americans always.
Thank you, Sen. Juan Hinojosa, advocate for Dr. Hector.
Thank you, Norma De Leon, and Garcia school community.
Thank you, Delia McLerran, principal, and Miller school community.
Thank you, Joe Ortiz, Chapter, and especially to the Ladies Auxiliary.
What a nice thing to do for Dr. Hector. The KEDT-TV movie -- You gotta see it to get the big picture of how it was and how it is. Stay in school. Get an education. Work hard. Get rich. God bless America. Support our Troops. Call your Mother.
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